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ABSTRACT 
 
 Citizen competence—though not always referred to in those exact words—is a common 
and important topic in political science. This thesis proposes a definition of citizen competence 
that is heavily, though not entirely, contingent on a person’s effort in gathering political 
information. Using data from the 2012 ANES pre-election survey, an empirical analysis is also 
conducted. Forty hypotheses are tested using one-way ANOVAs to look at the correlation 
between citizen competence and citizen satisfaction with common normative ideals held 
regarding American democracy. Results indicate that there is strong support for the theory that 
citizen competence is correlated with citizen satisfaction of two normative ideals: 1) Government 
pays attention to what the people think and 2) the views of the people affect what the 
government does.  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for 
direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much 
variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in 
that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can 
manage with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world. Their 
persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone else’s 
need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia. (Lippmann [1922] 1956: 16) 
 
 
 
 The above quote from Walter Lippmann’s book Public Opinion summarizes the 
difficulties presented by the American political system to its citizens. To start, there is simply too 
much information for each American to know all of it. Even if one uses 1776 as the starting point 
or assumes that information predating the signing of the United States Constitution is irrelevant 
(which is untrue and unwise), there is no way for people to know all the events, issues, 
precedents, debates, policies, candidates and elections that are relevant to political life as an 
American citizen. On top of the exorbitant amount of information lies the limitations of the 
human mind. Let us assume for one moment there is a person whose mind holds all the 
information just mentioned. That person would still not be “equipped” to make sense of it all. 
 Yet all Americans are actors in the theater of American politics. Regardless of individual 
limitations and the daunting task of making sense of all the information, we all take part at one 
time or another. Though the human mind is cognitively limited, it has considerable simplifying 
abilities, creating shortcuts and using cues from others to help us “traverse” the political world. 
However, one more barrier stands in the way of Americans on their way to political activity. 
While Americans attempt to navigate using the maps their minds have drawn, others are coming 
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in and drawing all over the map. Misinformation, misleading, manipulation and downright lying 
are common occurrences, and they make a great mess of things.  
This thesis is an exploration of the various ideas presented in Lippmann’s quote. It began 
as an inquiry into the question, “Are American voters stupid?” The question came to mind 
because of conversations I had with friends, family and colleagues over the past few years where 
one participant in the conversation would make a claim about the stupidity of the American 
people. The conversations were sparked by such seminal political science works as Michael Delli 
Carpini and Scott Keeter’s What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters and John 
Zaller’s The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. These and other works do an excellent job of 
advancing social science’s ability to explain why people do what they do. However, when 
conversations about these works moved beyond the content of the book, there was often 
someone in the conversation willing to posit that people act the way they do because, “People are 
stupid.” Why do Americans exhibit such little knowledge of the workings of the U.S. 
government? “People are stupid.” Why might people be so incapable of holding consistent 
ideologies? “People are stupid.” I argue that this explanation is not sufficient. 
 The first step in answering any question is to define the words in the question. This 
question has just three words, two of which need defining: “Are people stupid?” By people I 
mean American citizens. The word “stupid” has varying definitions depending on the context in 
which it is used and the person defining the term. The 1996 edition of Webster’s Dictionary 
which has been at my side throughout the entirety of my education provides three definitions for 
“stupid”: “1. lacking intelligence; dull. 2. showing or proceeding from a lack of intelligence. 3. 
tediously dull.” (Webster’s Dictionary 1996: 657) The same concepts were repeated in various 
online dictionary definitions that I found. I chose the first definition provided in my trusted 
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dictionary; lacking intelligence, dull. The question then became, “Are American citizens 
unintelligent or dull?”  
Not far into a review of the literature regarding this question it became apparent that the 
question was somewhat invalid. Given the definition of stupid being used, there simply is not 
evidence to support the claim that American citizens are stupid. There is evidence to support 
applying many adjectives to American citizens, but “stupid” is not one of them. “Stupid” is a 
reference to mental capacity, and though humans are limited cognitively, it is not accurate to 
make such a generalized proclamation with the term. Pressing further, I found that the point 
being made by people proclaiming the stupidity of Americans was likely more along the lines of 
“ignorance” and “incompetence” than stupidity. Definitions being as important as they are, there 
is a large difference between proclaiming that people are stupid versus ignorant or incompetent.  
The definition of competence stuck out to me as the likely intended meaning. If true, the 
question becomes, “Are Americans citizens competent in their civic participation?” Turning 
again to Webster’s Dictionary we see that “competent” has three definitions: “1. having suitable 
skill, experience, etc., for some purpose. 2. adequate but not exceptional. 3. legally qualified as 
to age, soundness of mind, etc.” (Webster’s Dictionary 1996: 133) Online definitions provide 
another important aspect of competence. For example, the first definition from the aptly titled 
Dictionary.com is, “1. having suitable or sufficient skill, knowledge, experience, etc., for some 
purpose; properly qualified.” [Emphasis added]1 Taking these two sources together, competence 
is a matter of sufficient skill or knowledge for the purpose of some task. It is important to keep in 
mind that competent is not synonymous with exceptional. Competent is adequate, not 
1 The “qualification” characteristic of competence is not relevant here because America, as I will discuss 
later in this paper, has nearly universal suffrage. If we are only going to focus on the qualification aspect 
then every U.S. citizen who is over eighteen years old and has not been convicted of certain crimes is a 
“competent voter”. 
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exceptional. Applying this definition to the question at hand, the question becomes, “Are 
American citizens sufficiently (not exceptionally) skilled or knowledgeable in their civic 
participation?” This question was not the end of this thesis’ journey, however. 
 It became apparent that answering such a question, if reserved for anyone at all, is 
reserved for someone with much greater knowledge than me. During my review of scholarly 
literature I found it difficult to come to any conclusion other than defending the competence of 
American citizens by finding holes or semantic inconsistencies in the arguments made by 
numerous works that claimed the opposite. This tendency to gravitate toward defense of 
American citizens comes from reading great political science works attempting the same feat 
such as E. E. Schattschneider’s The Semisovereign People. Though the major takeaway from the 
book is Schattschneider’s profound accusation that the American political system is dominated 
by the economic upper class, one point that stands out to me is his defense of the American 
people by attacking the pollsters who claim their ignorance:  
One implication of public opinion studies ought to be resisted by all friends of 
freedom and democracy; the implication that democracy is a failure because the 
people are too ignorant to answer intelligently all the questions asked by the 
pollsters. This is a professorial invention for imposing professorial standards on 
the political system and deserves to be treated with extreme suspicion. Only a 
pedagogue would suppose that the people must pass some kind of examination to 
qualify for participation in a democracy. Who, after all, are these self-appointed 
censors who assume that they are in a position to flunk the whole human race? 
(Schattschneider [1960] 1975: 132) 
Reviewing literature for this thesis combined with echoes of Schattschneider pervading my 
thoughts shifted this work toward a new way of thinking about citizen competence. The purpose 
of this thesis is to present that new way of thinking. 
 Chapter 2 will examine relevant literature regarding the role of a citizen, citizenship in a 
democracy and how citizens process political information with an eye on the most common form 
of participation in American democracy: voting. Chapter 2 concludes by presenting two theories. 
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The first theory that citizen competence is a matter of effort in gathering information. The second 
theory is that citizen competence promotes citizen satisfaction with two specific normative ideals 
that many people hold regarding democracy: 1) Public officials care what citizens think and 2) 
citizens have a say in what the government does. An empirical examination of my second theory 
is conducted in Chapter 3. The analysis includes a discussion of forty one-way ANOVAs 
conducting using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES). The results support 
my theory that citizen competence promotes satisfaction with the normative ideals stated above. 
Finally, this paper concludes with a short Conclusion in Chapter 4 outlining the implications of 
my definition of citizen competence and the results of my empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
 
Literature Review 
 This literature review contains four sections corresponding to various areas of focus. The 
first section will provide a primer for a topic that will be explored in the theory and empirical 
chapters of the paper: citizen satisfaction. The second section will focus on theory and history 
associated with the role of citizens generally. Though the United States currently has a low 
standard for citizenship, a historical context is needed for full understanding of our current 
system. The third section will dive further into the role of citizens but focus more on the 
theoretical role of a citizen in a democracy. This allows one to narrow the focus to the American 
system of government. The final section combines literature in political science, political 
psychology and cognitive science to shed light on what we actually know of human behavior in a 
democracy. 
 
The United States Constitution and Citizen Satisfaction 
 The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, beginning with the words “We the People of the 
United States, in Order to…” lays out various objectives that the Constitution—and the 
subsequent government it outlines—is attempting to achieve. These objectives can be considered 
the “goals” of the U.S. government at its founding. Two such goals are insuring “domestic 
Tranquility” and promoting “the general Welfare”. Tranquility refers to a state of being calm, at 
peace or being without tumult. Welfare is simply a matter of being well; whether that be physical 
health, mental health or monetary well-being. The reason these concepts are important—as I will 
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discuss more in-depth later—is because I believe that citizen competence contributes to the 
satisfaction of citizens in their political life.  
 
The Role of the Citizen 
 Like many areas of political science, theories on the role of a citizen extend back 2,500 
years to ancient Athens. I will begin my discussion of political theory on the role of the citizen 
with the great philosophers Plato and Aristotle. The reader should keep in mind that the scenarios 
being laid out here regarding the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle reflect ideal city-states 
described in each philosopher’s writing. The actual function of ancient Athens was different. 
In the Socratic dialogue The Republic, Plato outlines his views on how a city-state should 
function. A key characteristic of Plato’s Republic is specialization. There are three classes of 
people with a philosopher-king ruling over the three classes. The top class of people is the 
guardian or ruling class. This is the class where wisdom or knowledge lies. It may seem odd to 
modern Americans but it is important to keep in mind that Athens was not a democracy, and its 
great philosophers did not think it should have been. It was believed that as long as the guardian 
class was virtuous Athens would be virtuous as the wisdom of the guardian class was the wisdom 
of Athens. (Bloom 1991)  
Below the guardian class in Plato’s Republic is the military class, and at the bottom is the 
service class (blacksmiths, farmers etc.). It is the role of each person, in order to have a 
functioning state, to perform their respective role. Some citizens are to be “educated” in a way 
that allows them to participate in dialectic in the agora. One major function of the Republic is to 
place people in their appropriate class and role. Not only are people assigned classes, but your 
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class is immutable. There is no opportunity for a blacksmith to move to the guardian class just as 
there is no opportunity for a guardian to become a farmer. (Ibid.)  
Notice that the above paragraph is not describing “citizens”. According to Aristotle, a 
person not participating in the political system—whether it is because they were not allowed or 
did not want to—was not considered a citizen. (Stalley 1998) Both Aristotle and Plato echo this 
sentiment on the importance of participation. Aristotle, however, provides a precise definition of 
a citizen. A citizens is, “[A person] who is entitled to share in deliberative or judicial office [of a 
city].” (Ibid.: 87) Aristotle also differs from Plato in that he believed there was not one perfect 
political system. He argued that different situations required different forms of government. 
(Ibid.) 
John Stuart Mill also notes the importance of participation (if one is to be considered a 
citizen) in his famous work Considerations on Representative Government. Beyond this, he 
emphasizes that the qualities of the society (citizens) determine how “good” a government can 
be. An electorate that is ignorant (or stupid), prejudiced, corrupt, passive, inattentive or careless 
will result in a government that has these qualities. This point cannot be overstated. To Mill, a 
government can only be good if the citizens are good. They must be competent, knowledgeable, 
morally righteous and attentive. (Mill [1861] 1895) 
At the same time, Mill acknowledges, much like the Athenians, that one role of 
government is to facilitate these qualities in the citizenry. (Ibid.)  Some may be surprised that the 
idea of a political system promoting civic knowledge among its citizens extends back to ancient 
Athens. In Book IV of The Republic Socrates proclaims to Adeimantus that all the troubles the 
Republic might face will be “slight” if it takes care of “the one great thing”. When asked by 
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Adeimantus what that “thing” is, Socrates responds, “[The peoples’] education and rearing.” 
(Bloom 1991: 101) 
Mill believed that citizens were extremely important to the function of a government; 
however, given their limited time and abilities, Mill’s position is that a representative 
government is the best form of government. He states that the best government is one where “the 
whole people participate”. However, since not everyone can participate outside of some small 
simple functions, “It follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative.” 
(Mill [1861] 1895: 69) 
As can be seen from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, ancient Athenians had a high 
standard of citizenship. Though the actual function of the Athenian political system changed over 
time, citizenship was limited—for the most part—to male property owners.2 A person’s ability to 
enjoy full participation in the Athenian political system was further restricted by a sort of 
competency test consisting of three questions. The questions checked a person’s willingness to 
take care of their elderly family members, their allegiance to the gods and their history of 
military service to Athens. (Samons 2004) 
Citizenship as it exists in the United States today is far less strict than it was in ancient 
Athens. In the U.S., citizenship is simply a product of the accident of one’s birth or fulfillment of 
the proper steps to become a naturalized citizen. Though the U.S. practices a low standard of 
citizenship, it practices a higher standard of voting rights, the most common form of participation 
in American politics. The restrictions that were placed on citizenship in Athens have made their 
way into and out of the right to vote in the United States.  
2 I will speak more about the changes experienced by the Athenian political system and the changing 
requirements for Athenian citizenship later in this section. 
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In ancient Athens citizenship was limited to male property owners. (Ibid.) It is commonly 
taught in American civics courses that when the U.S. was founded only white, male property 
owners could vote. However, a transformation of voting rights took place in the U.S. between 
1790 and 1860. A growing economy created more people who were valued community members 
that did not necessarily own land; thus, land requirements were eliminated. As America 
continued to grow and change, more and more restrictions were lifted so that by 1855 there were 
very few formal economic requirements to voting. Voting rights continued to expand, 
eliminating restrictions based on race and gender.  Currently, the only requirements to vote are 
that a person is a U.S. citizen over the age of 18 and has not been convicted of certain crimes. 
(Keyssar 2009) 
 
Democratic Theory 
Having looked at popular philosophy about the role of the citizen, it is the task of this 
section to look specifically at the role of a citizen in a democracy. Though this review will end 
with a look at citizenship in the United States, it begins—like the last section—with a look at 
democratic theory in ancient Athens. 
Citizenship in Athens was limited to male property owners until the policy of demokratia 
was introduced. The word “demokratia” is a combination of two Greek words: demos (people) 
and kratos (power). (Samons 2004) After demokratia was introduced, the right to vote in 
Athenian councils was expanded to the point where nearly all men could vote. This is especially 
important for the Athenian political system because there was no such thing as a central 
“government” in ancient Athens. Nor did they practice any sort of separation of powers. The 
demos (people) literally was the Athenian government. The people (or a select group of them) 
 
 
11 
 
voted to go to war and then fought the wars. The people voted to raise taxes and then paid the 
taxes. (Samons 2004) 
 The institution of demokratia, Samons argues, was the beginning of the end for Athens. 
As the vote was expanded to more and more people, and because the people were still the ones 
who decided to vote for things like wars and deficit spending, poorer decisions were made. 
According to Samons, the Athenian people chose leaders whom they could feel superior to. 
Without leaders able to lead, and with the will of the people so present in the decision-making 
apparatus, Athens was doomed to fail. (Ibid.) This sentiment is echoed by Publius in Federalist 
Paper No. 63 when he remarks, “What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often 
escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their 
own passions.” (Publius Federalist No. 63) 
 Though demokratia was likely not the sole reason for the fall of Athens, Samons makes a 
valid point about the ability of citizens to effectively rule themselves. This is why philosophers 
such as J.S. Mill and Edmund Burke advocated for representative government. Specifically, 
Burke was a strong advocate for trustee representation. In Burke’s view, though the relationship 
between representative and constituent is to be close and the opinions of constituents are to 
weigh on their representatives, the representative is ultimately in a position of judgment. Burke 
stated that government and legislation are, “Matters of reason and judgment, and not of 
inclination.” Speaking about the British Parliament, Burke said the job of Parliament is to do 
what is best for the nation, not what is best for each individual district. (Burke, Speech to the 
Electors of Bristol) 
 Strong opposition to heavy involvement by the public is not confined to non-American 
thinkers and ancient philosophers. Many of the founders of the United States were vehement 
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anti-democrats. The most insightful glimpse we have into the minds of the founders regarding 
their views on how the U.S. government should function is found in the Federalist and Anti-
Federalist Papers. These documents contain many warnings regarding public opinion, majority 
rule and democracy itself. James Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 10 may be the most cited 
document regarding the dangers of the will of the people. I will continue that tradition here: 
[I]t may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of 
the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the 
people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may 
be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, 
may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and 
then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or 
extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the 
public weal [.] (Madison Federalist No. 10) 
 
Here Madison simultaneously points out one of the dangers of factions and lays out one of the 
many important questions tackled in the Federalist Papers. The danger is that small groups can 
gain power by nefarious means and cause major harm to the public. The question is whether 
small autonomous states can handle such dangers. Later in the same piece Madison provides the 
answer; a form of government not dissimilar from the one laid out in the final draft of the U.S. 
Constitution. Madison states, “The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this 
respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to 
the State legislatures.” (Ibid.) 
 Adding to the anti-democratic corner are works such as Ackerman’s Dualist Democracy 
which argues that America is, in practice, a “dualist democracy”. In this theory, there are two 
types of lawmaking in America. There is the everyday lawmaking done by the government, and 
there is the lawmaking done during extraordinary times when major actions are needed. In this 
model American government is rarely a government of “we the people” because “the people” are 
not involved in the vast majority of the decisions. (Ackerman 1993) 
 
 
13 
 
 The United States has experienced a strong push for democratization and citizen 
involvement in its recent history. One aspect of this push is the call for a more deliberative 
democracy. Though deliberative democracy (much like the term democracy itself) is difficult to 
define, Gutmann and Thompson (2004) provide a good definition:  
[Deliberative democracy is] a form of government in which free and equal 
citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they 
give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, 
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens 
but open to challenge in the future. (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 7) 
 
For a comprehensive look at how the authors build this definition the reader can refer to 
Gutmann and Thompson’s (2004) Why Deliberative Democracy? According to some, 
understanding deliberation may help us understand the role that citizens can potentially play in a 
democracy. (Mendelberg 2002) Also, despite a push for a more deliberative democracy, it must 
be acknowledged that the United States may already have widespread citizen deliberation on a 
small, local level. (Ibid.) It must also be asked, however, whether or not Americans (and humans 
in general) are capable of deliberating in the way that such idealistic theories set forth. That 
question will be addressed later in this paper. 
 It may also be the case that deliberation is best—and can best contribute to a healthy 
American democracy—when it is highly inclusive. According to Landemore (2013), cognitive 
diversity is more important for a group’s problem-solving ability than the abilities of the 
individuals in the deliberating group. Cognitive diversity is the variety of mental tools or 
mechanisms that humans use to solve problems or make judgments. If we assume that cognitive 
diversity is more important than individual ability, a deliberative apparatus that is more inclusive 
is preferred because it will increase the cognitive diversity of the deliberating group. With 
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increased cognitive diversity, the deliberation is better, or as Landemore puts it, “More-inclusive 
deliberating groups are smarter.” (Landemore 2013: 104) 
Another important piece for students of democracy to consider is Downs’ 1957 book, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy. The popular conception of this classic work is that it is a 
rousing cry for the irrationality of voting. Though he does acknowledge that it is entirely possible 
for people to rationally choose not to vote, my reading of the work suggests that his most 
important point is how irrational it is for many citizens to exert much effort gathering political 
information for their vote choices. The work does not conclude by saying that a rational actor 
will not vote. Downs says, “In general, it is irrational to be politically well-informed because the 
low returns from data simply do not justify their cost in time and other scarce resources.” 
(Downs 1957: 259) The irrationality of gathering information is the main point of An Economic 
Theory of Democracy. 
 Regardless, the popular conception of Downs’ work continues. Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968) use this perception as the basis of their response to Downs. In this work the authors 
respond to Downs’ calculus by adding a variable that Downs did not consider. As Riker and 
Ordeshook explain, despite Downs’ claim about the theoretical irrationality of voting, millions of 
people vote every election cycle in the United States. If we assume people are rational actors, as 
they are in Downs’ calculus, why are they voting given the irrationality of the act? The answer is 
the “D-Variable” or duty. A citizen’s sense of duty adds to the benefits one gets from voting. The 
benefits of fulfilling one’s duty to their country and their democracy is so great that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. With benefits outweighing costs, the citizen votes. (Riker and Ordeshook 
1968) 
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 There are a host of other theoretical democratic voting models including retrospective 
voting (Fiorina 1981) and two variations on a low-information reasoning voter model 
(Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991). Fiorina advances a model often credited to 
V.O. Key Jr. known as the “reward-punishment” or retrospective voting model. In this model the 
voter evaluates their economic situation (and possibly the economic situation of those close to 
them) and assesses whether or not they think the current administration should stay in power 
given the economic situation. If the voter is displeased they will vote against the incumbent. If 
the voter is satisfied with the situation they will vote for the incumbent.  
Sniderman advances a heuristic-driven voter model. In this model the voter (whom it is 
assumed has limited cognitive abilities and low levels of political information) is able to make a 
well-reasoned decision because they receive information from shortcuts or heuristics. Popkin’s 
book argues for the prototypical “low-information rationality” voter model. The model 
emphasizes the sources of information that voters use as well as their beliefs about how 
government works. The low-information rationality voter combines, in an efficient and rational 
way, learning (from sources of information) and past experiences (from daily life, past elections, 
etc.) to reason their way to a vote decision. 
As can be seen from the above review, democratic theory and the role of the citizen in the 
United States is largely about the vote. This is understandable and considering it is by far the 
most common form of political participation in the U.S., with about 70% of the population 
having voted at some point. (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 51)  
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Citizen Behavior and Information Processing 
 The final topic to be discussed in this review is what we actually know about voter 
behavior, especially how voters process information. This is the largest section of the literature 
review as it is the most important in forming a theory of citizen competence. I will begin by 
reviewing the literature that has been used as evidence to suggest that people are, indeed, stupid 
or incompetent. I will then review the pieces that point to an American electorate that is 
intelligent and competent. While reading the literature and forming summaries of the pieces I 
used a simple plus-minus (+ or -) system to keep track of the pieces that pointed to incompetence 
(the minuses) versus those that suggest competence (the pluses). I have transmitted that system 
to the section headers that follow. 
 
The Minuses 
 As mentioned previously, there are two works that seem to come up often in 
conversations regarding citizen competence. First is John Zaller’s The Nature and Origins of 
Mass Opinion. Second is Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter’s What Americans Know about 
Politics and Why it Matters. Both pieces fall in the lineage of classic 20th century authors who 
painted bleak pictures of the American public, describing the electorate as disengaged and 
inarticulate (Lippmann [1927] 1993) and voters as either partisan or not much involved 
(Campbell et al. [1960] 1980). Zaller’s argument rests on the premise that the American 
electorate is so large and each individual occupies such a miniscule space in it that they are 
exposed to a small fraction of the whole world of political information. Because of this, Zaller 
argues voters must rely on “others” to receive the information necessary to make a vote decision. 
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(Zaller 1992: 6) Zaller’s argument is elite-centric. He views political elites as the “others” whom 
voters get information from. 
 Given that elites strongly influence the information available to citizens when making a 
vote decision, Zaller outlines a Reception/Resistance-Accessibility-Response (RAS) model to 
explain how individuals form their opinions. It is in this RAS model that Zaller accounts for the 
response instability often demonstrated in public opinion polls and surveys. Because humans 
must rely on the accessibility of information stored in their memory, when asked a survey 
question at two distinct points in time a person might access different information each time the 
question is asked. This causes demonstrable variance and inconsistency in answers. (Zaller 1992)  
On the surface this model seems to suggest that people do not even hold true opinions, 
echoing an argument made in 1962 by Phillip E. Converse’s seminal piece, The Nature of Belief 
Systems in Mass Publics. Converse argues that people do not hold strong political ideologies. 
(Converse 1962) Continuing this work, Markus and Converse (1979) found evidence to suggest 
that people adjust their issue preferences to match that of their preferred candidate and, in an 
opposite manner, people will also adjust the perceived issue preferences of candidates in order to 
match their own preferences. (Markus and Converse 1979: 1068) Taking the work of Converse 
and Zaller together paints a bleak picture of public opinion. Not only can we not rely on people 
to come up with their own opinions—because they rely on the information and opinions of 
other—but people do not hold strong ideologies and cannot maintain consistent opinions. 
However, I will argue that they do not paint as bleak a picture as some surface-level readings of 
them might suggest. I will expand on this idea later in this section. 
 There are two questions posed in the title of Delli Carpini and Keeter’s book. First, what 
do Americans know about politics? Second, why does what they know matter. I have seen 
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multiple people walk away from the book answering the first question with something akin to 
“very little” and the second with “Americans are stupid”. I believe this to be a misreading of 
Delli Carpini and Keeter’s work. 
What Americans Know is littered with tables and graphs showing the results of analyses 
conducted using survey data gather between 1950 and 1990. They show respondents’ levels of 
knowledge on a wide variety of political questions. For example, Table 2.2 on pages 70-71 
shows results from various surveys measuring “Knowledge of Institutions and Processes [of 
government]”. There are over 100 questions shown on this chart and the results to some can be 
disheartening. For example, in 1989 two percent of respondents could name two Fifth 
Amendment rights.3 In 1952 nineteen percent could name all three branches of the U.S. 
government and forty-four percent could name one branch of government. (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996: 70-71) When compared to what people do know, such as the identity of pop-culture 
icons and the ability to match quotes to songs and movies, a disheartening effect may occur. 
However, there is far more to this book than idiosyncratic survey results. Again, I will discuss 
the larger picture later in this section. 
I will now move from assessments of competence via political knowledge surveys to 
what we know about how humans process information. The concept of motivated reasoning is 
described as, “both a virtue and a vice.” (Lodge and Taber 2000) The motivated reasoning model 
presented by Lodge and Taber has three steps or premises. First, humans use “hot cognition”. 
This means that when someone takes in new information it is assigned an affective measure (a 
positive or negative feeling, a “like” or “dislike”). Second, humans use “on-line processing”. In 
on-line processing humans keep a running tally of affectively charged information. (Ibid.) A 
3 Though disheartening to some, one must ponder the significance of such a response rate in today’s 
world. After all, I cannot, off the top of my head, name even one Fifth Amendment. I can, however, open 
the U.S. Constitution application on my smartphone and look it up. 
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person may, for example, have a running tally of information in their memory that tells them 
they do not like the Democratic Party. Finally, people use a “How do I feel?” heuristic. When 
making a vote choice, a person accesses the running tallies relevant to the choice at hand that 
they have been keeping and have been formed using “on-line processing”. Each piece of 
information in the tally has been affectively charged through “hot cognition”. These affectively 
charged ideas give a person a simple positive or negative cue to use when making the decision. 
(Ibid.) In the case of our anti-Democrat example, when a vote decision requires an assessment of 
a Democratic candidate, our voter’s perception of the Democratic Party is activated and tells 
them they do not like the Democratic Party. 
But why is motivated reasoning a “virtue and a vice”? On the virtue side, motivated 
reasoning allows people to make well-reasoned decisions that match their feelings and 
evaluations of the decision. On the vice side, it biases the assessment of new information. Once 
an affect is assigned to a specific entity, each new piece of information about that entity is 
viewed through the lens of that affect; thus, motivated reasoning. This eliminates any possibility 
of a citizen acting free from biased decisions whether they are making a vote decision or 
evaluating what they think about a piece of U.S. foreign policy. 
Motivated reasoning ties into another possible defect in human cognition; the ability (or 
inability) of humans to adjust an incorrect predisposition when presented with corrective 
information. Nyhan and Reifler (2010), in their highly popular article When Corrections Fail, 
present evidence that people with strongly held views reject information that contradicts their 
view. The authors conducted experiments with subjects that held incorrect predispositions about 
a certain contemporary political issue. When presented with correct information on the issue the 
subjects who were identified as having strong predispositions rejected the information and 
 
 
20 
 
sometimes even demonstrated a strengthening of their incorrect predisposition despite the 
corrective information. The authors refer to this as a “backfire effect”. (Nyhan and Reifler 2010) 
Nyhan et al 2014 found similar effects when studying messages promoting vaccinations. 
Though they found evidence to suggest the possibility of effective messaging decreasing the 
misperception that vaccines cause autism, none of the corrective information provided in their 
survey increased parents’ likelihood to vaccinate their children. Much like Nyhan and Reifler’s 
2010 study discussed above, parents who came into the survey with the strongest opposition to 
vaccinations became even less likely to vaccinate their children after presented with corrective 
information. (Nyhan et al. 2014: e841) Backfire effect fits the ideas put forth by previous 
research showing that voters who are politically sophisticated are immutable in their views and 
decisions. High information voters are more partisan, unflinching in ideology and less responsive 
to changes in election information. (Niemi, Weisberg and Kimball 2011: 75-78) 
There is also evidence to suggest that the two saving graces of low-information voter 
rationality are nonexistent. As Bartels (1996) plainly puts it: “The political ignorance of the 
American voter is one of the best-documented features of contemporary politics.” (Bartels 1996: 
194) In response to the political ignorance literature some researchers began crafting reasons that 
a politically ignorant electorate might be inconsequential. Two popular theories are: 1) low-
information voters can act as though they were high-information voters through the use of 
information cues or heuristics and 2) individual voter errors are canceled out by a large 
electorate. Bartels turns these two theories into hypotheses to be tests them using empirical 
analysis. The results of his analysis disconfirm both theories. (Bartels 1996) 
Bartels also tackled a specific contemporary political issue in his article Homer Gets a 
Tax Cut (2005). Here he looks at one of the issues surrounding the Bush tax cuts of the early 
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2000’s. Although the vast majority of Americans disliked or even despised the extent and 
worsening of income inequality in the United States, they consistently and strongly supported the 
Bush tax cuts, which resulted in increased income inequality. One explanation for this could be 
that the opposition to income inequality may have been overstated. Bartels’ study suggests that 
the reason was that Americans failed to connect the effect of increased income inequality to its 
cause, the Bush tax cuts. (Bartels 2005)  
The two proposed saving graces of political ignorance are also far from a certainty. 
Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) test each of them—low-information rationality through heuristics 
and mass electoral effects—and find evidence to disconfirm both. The authors propose an 
alternative theory that is more skeptical of the rationality of the American electorate put forth by 
such scholars as Page and Shapiro (1992). This more skeptical view not only warns against the 
overstatement of the competence of citizens and mass electorates, it shows evidence of 
significant distortions of public opinion and the propensity of the public to send misguided and 
incorrect signals to policy makers. Perhaps most profoundly, the authors suggest that human 
cognition is not well-suited for the two main tasks of citizens: voting and evaluating public 
policy. (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000) Combining this reconsideration of a “rational public” with 
Nyhan and Reifler’s work on the inability of people to accept correct information there is a 
strong case against the saving graces mentioned above and the push for deliberative democracy. 
Another argument regarding the incompetence of American citizens involves their 
inability to form consensus. McClosky (1964) addressed the question of whether or not 
consensus among the public is a requisite for democracy and what implications a lack of 
consensus would have on democracy. He found that there is not a consensus in the general, 
politically unsophisticated public about basic American ideals and ideologies such as equality 
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and freedom. However, there is consensus among the small minority of political sophisticates. 
(McClosky 1964)  
Although there are dangers to having no consensus throughout most of the citizenry, 
McClosky does not view it as much of a problem. McClosky posits that the unsophisticated 
majority does not have much influence in the political system. The sophisticated minority holds 
most of the influence, and because they are largely in agreement on their values they can take 
care of things just fine. (Ibid.) The results of this study and the claims made by its author fly in 
the face of advocates for a more democratic American political system. 
 
The Pluses 
 The first step in presenting the case for citizen competence is to complete the stories told 
by Zaller and Delli Carpini and Keeter. Zaller’s RAS model relies heavily on political elites to 
distribute information. Because voters are so reliant on political elites (media figures, elected 
officials, “experts”, etc.) for information, citizens are open to misinformation. Zaller says that 
information is not distributed by elites in a “just the facts” manner. Thus, very few Americans 
have opinions based on “just the facts”. The opinions of Americans rely on the biases of the 
political elite. (Zaller 1992) This puts the burden of proper information on the political elites, not 
the average citizen. 
 Research on the knowledge of the American people up to the point when What 
Americans Know was written was based on relatively small and idiosyncratic data. The goal of 
the book was to expand on the previous research and provide an alternative to the caricature 
picture often painted regarding the political sophistication of the American people. (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996: xi) The results of their research paint a picture of the American electorate that 
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is more optimistic than much of the previous research. Levels of knowledge among the 
American public seem to resemble a normal curve with a small portion being very informed, a 
small portion being highly uninformed and a large middle section. Though knowledge elites 
make up a small portion of the public, there is not a vast group of highly uninformed people 
either. (Ibid.: 18) The authors also found evidence to suggest that people are capable of making 
rational decisions even with low information. In their own words, “Evidence of political 
ignorance is not proof that citizens are fools.” (xii) 
 According to What Americans Know, the political knowledge of an individual is the 
result of the interaction between the ability, motivation and opportunity of that individual to 
become knowledgeable. This model is distinct from previous models because it places emphasis 
on both the individual’s observation of the political world and the presentation of the political 
world to the individual. The model does not dismiss or ignore the idea that the public is 
politically ignorant, but it also recognizes that part of the reason the public may be ignorant is 
because of how information is presented (or not presented) to them. (8)  
Regarding the tables and charts mentioned earlier, Delli Carpini and Keeter believe such 
surveys are nearly useless as a measure of the competence of American citizens. They conclude 
that it is meaningless to talk about how much the “public” knows about politics. (269) Their 
model also does not excuse an uninformed citizenry. The authors make a strong case for an 
informed citizenry but they think of the question in a different way than previous writers. In the 
words of the authors, “The fundamental question is not if the American system is democratic, but 
how democratic it is and for whom.” (61)  Put another way, “Being informed is not an either-or 
proposition, it is a more-or-less proposition.” (61)  
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The ideas that misinformation plays a role in mass opinion and that being informed is not 
an either-or proposition are echoed by Kuklinski et al (2000). Kuklinski’s political information 
classification is three-fold. There are informed people, uninformed people and misinformed 
people. Misinformation is widespread in some areas and this has serious implications for 
literature on the study of heuristics and elite effects on framing and information gathering. 
Kuklinski treats information as the “currency of democracy”. Thinking of the issue this way 
sheds light on the possibility of manipulation of the system through misinformation. This leads 
people to firmly hold incorrect beliefs. (Kuklinski et al. 2000) In this sense, people may not be 
stupid or incompetent, but misinformed. 
The existence of misinformed people is evidence of what Talisse (2004) calls belief 
ignorance. Belief ignorance occurs when a person holds false beliefs for reasons outside of their 
control (e.g., misleading or biased information or manipulation by political elites). According to 
Talisse this type of ignorance does not harm the health of democracy; specifically, its 
deliberative capabilities. However, another type of ignorance, which he labels as agent 
ignorance, is cause for greater concern. In agent ignorance a person’s false beliefs are a result of 
that person’s own cognitive failures. Widespread agent ignorance would be a major blow to the 
defense of the competence of the American people and, “devastating to every conception of 
democracy.” (Talisse 2004: 461) Talisse posits, however, that research showing the uninterested 
nature and overall political ignorance of Americans is demonstrating nothing more than belief 
ignorance. (Talisse 2004) 
But what about the act of misleading as opposed to supplying misinformation? 
Misinformation is more akin to lying while misleading is the ability to fool someone or some 
group of people. Bartels touches on this idea in his study of the Bush tax cuts. Remember in the 
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discussion of this article earlier that Bartels’ reason for widespread support of the Bush tax cuts 
was that Americans failed to make the connection between the tax cuts and increased income 
inequality. (Bartels 2005) The failed connection was likely caused by the fact that, because of the 
tax cuts, Americans received checks in the mail from the U.S. government. The checks that 
Americans received, in a way, hid the fact that the wealthiest Americans were receiving much 
larger monetary breaks because of the tax cuts.  
If general knowledge surveys are not a sufficient means to test the ability of a citizen to 
fulfill their role, as What Americans Know and other pieces have suggested, maybe a measure of 
“correct voting” can do it. When evaluating the American electorate against normative 
democratic theory, Lau and Redlawsk (1997) argue that the most appropriate standard to ascribe 
is whether or not voters “vote correctly”. Voting correctly means that a voter comes to the same 
decision they would have made if they had been able to know all available information about the 
decision. Using experimental data the authors find that most people do vote correctly. The 
authors also determine that the rate of correct voting in the five presidential elections between 
1972 and 1988 was about 75%. (Lau and Redlawsk 1997) The obvious question to be asked, 
though, is whether 75% is a high enough rate to claim that Americans are meeting the normative 
standard placed on them by democratic theory?4 
Operating under the same model of correct voting, Lau, Andersen and Redlawsk (2008) 
tested several hypotheses about the factors that affect correct voting. They found support for 
seven hypotheses that place the responsibility of voting correctly on both the individual (an 
individual’s motivation and cognitive capacity) and the larger electoral system (the availability 
4 This is an especially appropriate question to ask when considering the notoriously low turnout rates in 
American elections, particularly in midterm elections. The national turnout rate for the 2014 midterms 
was around 36%. (United States Elections Project 2014) If only 36% of people vote and only 75% of 
those who voted did so correctly, then only 27% of the American electorate voted in 2014 and did so 
correctly. 
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of heuristics, the difficulty of a vote decision and an election’s information environment). (Lau, 
Andersen and Redlawsk 2008)  
Another determinant of citizen competence may be framing effects. An issue “frame” is 
the context in which an idea or story is presented. For example, a newspaper story about a 
proposed oil pipeline through northern Nebraska might be framed as an opportunity for job 
creation or as a misuse of eminent domain. Druckman (2001) examines framing effects and their 
impact on citizen competence. Though the author acknowledges some cases of incompetence, on 
the whole he argues that, “Citizens use frames in a competent and well-reasoned manner.” 
(Druckman 2001: 225) 
Druckman’s argument is in direct refutation of claims made by scholars that stem from 
what I consider a misreading of Zaller (1992). The argument, outlined by Druckman, is two-fold. 
First, “Framing effects imply that citizens base their political preferences on arbitrary 
information.” Second, “Elites often use framing to manipulate citizens’ judgments.” (Ibid.: 226) 
Because of this, it is argued that the existence of framing effects proves the incompetence of 
citizens. I agree that Zaller would argue elites manipulate information in order to manipulate the 
decisions of voters, but it is not my reading of Zaller that says citizens base their opinions on 
arbitrary information. The RAS model leaves room for ambivalence and inconsistency but the 
information is not arbitrary. Moreover, it is a misreading of Zaller to use his book as an argument 
for the incompetence of citizens purely based on the existence of framing effects. 
As mentioned previously, one of the reasons scholars have given showing that a 
politically ignorant citizenry may be inconsequential is the ability of people to use heuristics or 
information shortcuts. In order to test the use of heuristics Lupia (1994) conducted an exit poll 
survey of participants in a 1988 California ballot initiative regarding insurance reform. The 
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results of the survey showed that people without “encyclopedic” knowledge of the initiative used 
information shortcuts (provided by information summaries and a “California Ballot Pamphlet”) 
to act as well-informed voters. This result is especially significant considering the most common 
and reliable information shortcut (Party ID) was not available in the election. The voters were 
choosing between a “Yes” vote and a “No” vote, not between candidates from the major parties. 
The author concludes that in this particular vote choice, the information environment allowed 
relatively uninformed voters to act as is they were well-informed voters. 
Page and Shapiro (1992) provide strong theoretical and statistical support for low-
information rationality theory and the possibility of a large electorate to cancel out individual 
ignorance. According to the authors there are two sources of skepticism regarding the American 
citizens’ ability to act competently. First, survey research suggests low levels of knowledge and 
inattentiveness to politics. Second, views and opinions expressed by individuals are changeable 
and inconsistent and are, therefore, invalid. (Page and Shapiro 1992) The authors argue that these 
concerns do not actually address the issue of public opinion, adding to the list of authors who 
consider general political information surveys to be nearly meaningless. On top of this, they find 
evidence to suggest that Americans actually hold strong, consistent views about political matters 
which are formed in a rational way. (Ibid.) 
The last area of research to be addressed in this review involves an intersection of 
disciplines; that of political science, psychology and cognitive science. In The Elements of 
Reason various scholars address the question of why people do what they do in the political 
realm. To borrow from E. E. Schattschneider, this is the most legitimate question for the authors. 
Where previous research on this topic focused on the outcome of a decision (vote choice, which 
is measured through post hoc surveys) the authors here make the case that the most important 
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part of figuring out why people do what they do comes before the vote decision. Before a person 
chooses to vote a certain way (or not vote at all) they must reason about the decision. This book 
attempts to identify various elements of reason. (Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin 2000) 
For political scientists to truly understand why people do what they do they must draw 
from other disciplines, specifically psychology and cognitive science. The idea of shrinking the 
gap between political science and psychology is credited to Herbert Simon and is affectionately 
referred to as “Simon’s Bridge”. According to Simon, understanding why people do what they 
do has less to do with how they can answer survey questions and more to do with science’s 
ability to understand how people process information. (Ibid.) Understanding how people process 
information is extremely difficult, but it is necessary to address in order to answer this book’s 
most legitimate question. 
 Chapter 3 of The Elements of Reason is particularly relevant to the topic of citizen 
competence. Aside from rejecting the conclusion that Americans are largely incompetent 
political actors because they cannot answer survey questions on political knowledge, the authors 
come up with a theory for how low-information citizens gain enough information to act 
competently. (Lupia and McCubbins 2000) The argument presented by Lupia and McCubbins 
can be demonstrated in a varying number of steps, depending on how specific one wants to be in 
explaining it. I prefer a six-step argument which is presented below.  
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Competence  
 
Reasoned Choice (low-information decision making) 
 
Knowledge 
 
Learning From Others 
 
Persuasion 
 
Trust (Influenced by Institutions) 
 
The arrows in the above chart could be substituted for the words “leads to”. In the Lupia and 
McCubbins model trusting sources of information leads to persuasion, which leads to learning 
from others, etc. It is important to note that the authors argue people take their cues on whom to 
trust from political institutions. They do not, however, acknowledge that taking cues from 
political institutions assumes an individual trusts said institutions to give them reliable cues. 
(Ibid.) 
This institution-centric view of low-information citizen competence is echoed in Chapter 
4 by Paul Sniderman. According to Sniderman, citizens with little information can make 
competent, reasoned choices because the decisions are shaped for them. Political institutions, 
particularly political parties, do the shaping, and the distinctive outcome of the decision is largely 
contingent on how the citizen goes about making the decision. (Sniderman 2000) Adding this to 
Lupia and McCubbins’ theory, people make reasoned choices but the choices are between 
previously set alternatives, and the decision is largely shaped by inputs from political 
institutions. Thus, even though there is a lot of information to consider when attempting to 
participate in the American political system, the information being presented and the choices to 
make have already been trimmed down making the decision easier. 
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Adding to the understanding of reasoning and choice—and adding to the complexity of 
the topic—is the idea of motivated reasoning. As mentioned previously, motivated reasoning is 
based on three premises: Hot cognition, on-line processing and the “How do I feel?” heuristic. 
As was also mentioned previously, motivated reasoning is seen as both a virtue and a vice. The 
virtue of motivated reasoning is that it allows people to make well-reasoned decisions that match 
their feelings and evaluations of the decision. The vice side is that motivated reasoning biases the 
assessment of new information. (Lodge and Taber 2000) 
The final element of reason presented in this volume is the theory of backstage cognition. 
This idea is a bit harder to paraphrase than the others in the book so I will simply restate the 
definition used by Mark Turner. According to Turner, “Backstage cognition is the integrated 
activity of intricate, systematic, powerful, and complex mental operations of interpretation and 
inference.” (Turner 2000) This concept may forever remain a theory because, crucially, it does 
not take place in conscious thought. Backstage cognition is made up of processes that happen 
outside of consciousness. In Turner’s opinion, backstage cognition is the most important insight 
that cognitive science can offer the social sciences. Such an abstract idea is difficult to explain 
but Turner gives a tremendous example of when backstage cognition takes place involving a 
1996 British Airways ad campaign. For this review’s purposes it suffices to say that backstage 
cognition involves the subconscious blending of concepts that precede conscious thought.  
 
Theory 
My argument here has two parts. First, citizen competence, as I have defined it, is 
partially determined by effort in information gathering. Second, people who are competent (i.e., 
those who have put sufficient effort into gathering political information) are more satisfied with 
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their government than those who are not competent. As was discussed in the literature review 
above, the level of performance American citizens display in their own political system is a 
matter of substantial debate. For as long as there have been democratic political systems there 
has been debate about how involved the citizens should be. Plato and Aristotle warned against 
the troubles of democracy just as the founders of the United States did, and early seminal pieces 
in political science claimed that Americans were not as present in the functioning of their 
political system as was previously thought. (Lippmann [1927] 1993; Campbell et al. 1960) 
Studies have suggested that Americans do not hold strong political ideologies (Converse 
1962; Markus and Converse 1979); that people are inherently biased, motivated thinkers (Lodge 
and Taber 2000); and that people are dogmatic and unwilling to adjust their beliefs even when 
presented with correcting information. (Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Nyhan et al. 2014) There is also 
evidence to suggest that humans are not fit to handle the tasks required of citizens, such as voting 
and evaluating public policy. (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000) These findings, however, do not 
condemn American democracy or its participants to failure. They are not a nail in the coffin of 
democracy. Rather, they serve as insights into the actuality of human behavior in the American 
system, and political systems in general. 
 Research also suggests that Americans live in an information environment that is 
misleading and full of misinformation. (Zaller 1992; Kuklinski et al. 2000; Bartels 2005) Despite 
this environment, research has found that Americans do a good job coming to correct, well-
reasoned voting decisions. (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Druckman 2001) Despite limited cognitive 
abilities, humans use low-information rationality (Lupia 1994), motivated reasoning (Lodge and 
Taber 2000) and backstage cognition (Turner 2000) to overcome the roadblocks presented to 
them in the information environment presented by the American political system. On top of this, 
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the legitimacy of using general information surveys to make broad claims about the political 
sophistication of the American people and about the health of American democracy has been 
called into question. (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Page and Shapiro 1992; Lupia, 
McCubbins and Popkin 2000) 
 Given the limitations of political knowledge surveys, the difficulties presented by the 
information environment in the American political system and the ability of humans (even with 
limited cognition) to “make some sense of it all”, I argue that a new theory of voter competence 
is needed. My theory is rooted in what can be termed “modern political psychology”, a new area 
of social science that focuses on human thought. Keeping the work of political psychology in 
mind, I take one step back and ask what happens before a voter forms thoughts about a candidate 
or an issue? What happens in order for a voter to be considered competent? At some time before 
thoughts and competence are to be considered, an individual must gather information. Therefore, 
competence, in my theory, is determined—at least in part—by effort in information gathering.  
 The competence of an individual is a question of whether or not that person is sufficiently 
qualified to perform some task. If the task is participating in the American political system—
voting, for example—then in order to be sufficiently qualified to participate that person must 
have gathered and processed some amount of information relevant to whatever form of 
participation they are attempting. In order to gather information a person must seek it out. This is 
the effort I am looking at. 
But why should we care about putting in the effort to make a competent vote decision, 
even if the effort required may be minimal? The answer to that question lies in the goal of 
government. The goal of government will vary depending on which individual you ask because 
different people, even within the same nation, have different expectations of their government. 
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However, it is safe to say that one commonly held belief among Americans is that the 
government should promote the happiness of its people—or at the very least not get in the way 
of their happiness. As discussed at the beginning of the literature, the U.S. Constitution lays out 
various goals the Constitution and subsequent government are to achieve. Two of the goals are 
insuring tranquility and promoting general welfare. Each of the goals can be helped by having 
citizens that are satisfied or content in their political life. Content citizens live a life that has less 
tumult and difficulty than citizens experiencing discontent. Citizens who are content with the 
way their government is functioning are living a more tranquil life and a life with greater 
welfare. If competence can promote contentment, then competence has a direct effect on the 
goals set forth in the U.S. Constitution.  
I argue that effort (and therefore competence) is important because it allows a person to 
be more satisfied (or content) with their government and political system. In particular, the 
normative ideals that one holds regarding citizen efficacy will be more satisfied among those 
who are more competent. Normative ideals are simply ideas, concepts or norms that widely held 
throughout a group of people. The norms I am discussing here are confined to U.S. citizens. 
Though probably not ubiquitous through the entire population, some normative ideals 
involving American democracy include the idea that “the people” should have a say in what the 
government does. It is also widely believed that our officials should pay some level of attention 
to the will of their constituents. I argue that Americans who are more competent (those who put 
forth greater effort in their information gathering) will also exhibit more satisfaction with such 
normative ideals. People who are exerting effort to gather information to understand various 
concepts, ideas or individuals in the American political system will feel like they are a part of the 
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system. They feel like they are contributing to a system that is important for the function of their 
country and one they have a duty to contribute to.  
The idea that competence contributes to satisfaction may sound odd considering the 
volume and fervor with which some factions of American politics proclaim their disgust with 
parts of the American political system. For example, many members of the Republican Party and 
ideological conservatives throughout the United States have been expressing opposition to 
President Barack Obama and his policies for much of the last seven years, beginning with his 
election in 2008. The passing of the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) in 2010 seemed to ramp 
up the fervor coming from such groups. Looking at an example on the opposite end of the 
ideological spectrum, President George W. Bush and his administration received strong 
opposition from Democrats and liberals because of the U.S. military’s actions in Iraq in the mid 
2000’s. In both examples we see groups that certainly would not be considered satisfied or 
content with their president or his policies. 
Why are these groups—which appear to pay close attention to the political system and 
therefore qualify as competent—so angry? There are two answers to that question. The first is 
that such people do not actually put as much effort into gathering information as it appears they 
do. Thus, they are not competent and would not be expected to exhibit more satisfaction 
according to my theory. The second answer is that the person or concept these people are 
directing their disgust toward is not the concept that I am looking at here.  
My theory is not addressing a particular group’s opposition to one person, one policy, or 
even a host of persons and policies. I am also not arguing that competence leads to complete 
satisfaction with every aspect of the American government. I am looking at larger, broader 
concepts that may be affected by the actions of a president or their policies but are not 
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completely determined by them. Specifically, I am looking at whether or not people feel that 
public officials care what they think and whether or not those people think they have a say in 
what the government does. Even if Jane Johnson absolutely despises President Obama, Jane does 
not necessarily feel that public officials completely ignore the average citizen or that she has 
absolutely no say in what the government does. People who are more competent are, generally, 
more satisfied. They may not be completely happy with the way things are going, but they are 
also not designing campaigns to overthrow the government.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND RESULTS 
 
My analysis will focus on two normative ideals that are a part of American political 
thought. The first ideal is that Americans have a say in what the government does. The second is 
that the American government pays attention to what the people think. I theorize that 
competence will positively affect the outlook that people have on these ideals. In other words, 
competent citizens will feel more strongly that they have a say in what the government does and 
that the government pays attention to what they think. However, analyses such as the one here— 
and all other empirical analyses conducted in scientific research—cannot prove causation. It 
must be noted that should the results of these analyses support my theory and meet my 
expectations, they will at best provide evidence to suggest correlation between the variable I 
have chosen. 
In order to test this theory I have run forty one-way ANOVAs using data gathered from 
the American National Elections Studies (ANES). The ANES are the gold standard of national 
voter surveys in the United States, conducting methodologically robust pre and post-election 
surveys for over six decades. ANES provides this data to researchers in order to help with 
research about American politics and elections. As the reader will see from the tables in the 
pages to come, the number of respondents to theses survey questions ranges from about 1,500 to 
nearly 6,000, providing statistically significant results for nearly all the analyses. I have selected 
two sets of questions from the 2012 ANES to be analyzed. One set of questions will measure the 
competence of respondents and will be used as independent variables. The other set measures the 
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satisfaction that respondents express regarding the two normative ideals outlined above and will 
be the dependent variables.  
Before moving on I must clarify three points regarding the questions being used in this 
analysis. First, the questions I am using regarding competence (the independent variables) are in 
accordance with my definition of competence. These questions ask respondents to identify, 
generally, how much attention they pay to politics and, specifically, how many days a week they 
view various news mediums. These questions are not meant to create a comprehensive 
understanding of what competence looks like precisely. There are innumerable considerations to 
be taken into account when describing citizen competence; these questions are used to provide us 
with a glimpse of some of those considerations. For example, respondents who pay less attention 
to politics are viewed under my theory as less competent than those who pay much attention to 
politics. Respondents who often watch national TV news are viewed as more competent than 
respondents who rarely view national TV news.  
Second, the questions regarding satisfaction with normative ideals (the dependent 
variables) are measuring how the respondents feel about these ideals. The goal here is not to 
measure how responsive the U.S. government is to its citizens in reality; rather, I am looking at 
whether or not the respondents to the 2012 ANES feel the government is meeting these 
normative standards. If, for example, a respondent answers positively to a question about public 
officials caring about what people like themselves think, then I take that to mean the respondent 
feels positively about the general normative ideal that public officials care about what people 
think. It is important to keep my theory in mind: People who put more effort into their vote 
decisions will be more satisfied with the normative ideals they hold toward their government. 
The satisfaction questions might also be considered questions regarding a common political 
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science term: efficacy. Though these questions may not be perfect for getting at the concept of 
satisfaction, I am using these efficacy questions as a proxy to look at satisfaction. I am assuming 
that positive responses to these efficacy questions represent a citizen who is more satisfied with 
the normative ideal being addressed in the question. 
Finally, I must make some clarifications about the format of the analyses and results 
below. Each question in the ANES survey is associated with a variable title that summarizes the 
question in shorthand. These shorthand titles are used to make analyzing the data with statistical 
software easier. For example, the first survey question below is coded as “respons_elections” in 
the official ANES survey codebook. I have recoded it to “respons_elections2” to make the 
statistical output (the tables and figures) flow more intuitively. The original answer options for 
“respons_elections” have thus been flipped to make the most positive response the highest 
number. Each code in the following pages that has a “2” at the end has been recoded in the same 
fashion (ensuring that the most positive answers correlate with the highest number) in order to 
make the tables and figures more intuitive.  
Recoding the variables to make the most positive response match the highest number is 
especially relevant for the means plots that are depicted in the figures below. In each figure I am 
expecting to see means plots that start in the lower left corner of the figure and progress in a 
linear fashion to the upper right corner. Recoding the variables does not ensure the ANOVAs 
will yield means plots that meet my expectations; it ensures that hypotheses which are supported 
will have means plots that look a certain way. Because I expect high competence to yield high 
satisfaction, a lower-left-to-upper-right linear shape is both easy to spot and makes intuitive 
sense. 
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According to my theory, I expect that the more people pay attention to what is going on 
in government and politics, the more they feel that elections make government pay attention. 
This is because people who are paying attention to politics feel more satisfied with the normative 
ideal that elections make the government pay attention to what the people think. To test this, I 
ran a one-way ANOVA with respons_elections2 as the dependent variable and 
interest_attention2 as the independent variable. The wording of these survey questions and 
possible respondent answers can be found below, immediately before the table and figure 
showing the results of the analysis. My hypothesis is that as respondent scores on the 
independent variable increase, the average values for the dependent variable will also increase. 
According to Table 1 (below), the hypothesis is supported by this analysis.  
 
RESPONS_ELECTIONS2 
How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the 
people think? 
1. Not much 
2. Some 
3. A good deal 
 
INTEREST_ATTENTION2 
How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? 
1. Never 
2. Some of the time 
3. About half the time 
4. Most of the time 
5. Always 
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Table 1.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by interest_attention2 
 
  
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 Never 150 1.76 (0.77)     
2.00 Some of the time 1515 1.99 (0.70)      
3.00 About half the 
time 
1243 2.05 (0.69)  
    
4.00 Most of the time 1955 2.12 (0.70)      
5.00 Always 1024 2.22 (0.72)      
Total 5887 2.08 (0.71)      
    
    
F-Statistic  26.391      
Significance   .000  Figure 1.  Means Plots of  
respons_elections2 by interest_attention2 
 
As Table 1 shows, the results of this analysis are statistically significant. We can see that as the 
value of interest_attention2 increases, the average value for respons_elections2 also increases. 
The average value increases from 1.76 to 2.22. This supports my hypothesis and my theory. 
According to my theory, I also expect that the more interest people have for political 
campaigns, the more they feel that elections make government pay attention to what the people 
think. This is because people who are more interested in political campaigns feel satisfied with 
the ideal of government paying attention to what the people think. To test this, I ran a one-way 
ANOVA with respons_elections2 again as the dependent variable and interest_following2 as the 
independent variable. The wording and possible answers for interest_following2 can be found 
below. The dependent variable is the same here as the first ANOVA (and for the first ten 
ANOVAs), so I will ask the reader to refer back to the first analysis for a refresher on the 
wording of respons_elections2. My hypothesis is that as respondent scores on the independent 
variable increase, values on the dependent variable will increase. According to Table 2 (below), 
this hypothesis is supported.  
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INTEREST_FOLLOWING2 
Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say 
that you have been [very much interested, somewhat interested or not much interested/ not much 
interested, somewhat interested or very much interested] in the political campaigns so far this 
year? 
1. Not much interested 
2. Somewhat interested 
3. Very much interested 
 
Table 2.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by interest_following2 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
 
  
  1.00 Not much 
interested 
889 1.81 (0.71) 
    2.00 Somewhat 
interested 
2450 2.03 (0.67)  
  
  3.00 Very much 
interested 
2547 2.22 (0.71)  
  
  Total 5886 2.08 (0.71)    
   
     
  F-Statistic 
 
122.763      
Significance   .000  
Figure 2.  Means Plots of  
respons_elections2 by interest_following2 
   
 
 
 
    The results of this analysis are statistically significant. Table 2 show that as values for 
interest_following2 increase the values for respons_elections2 also increase with values 
increasing from 1.81 to 2.22, falling in a nearly straight line. This supports my hypothesis and 
theory. 
I also expect that the more days per week a person views news on the Internet (not 
including sports), the more they feel that elections make government pay attention to what 
people think. This is expected because respondents who often view Internet news also feel that 
the government pays attention to what people like themselves think. To test this, a one-way 
ANOVA was used with respons_elections2 as the dependent variable and prmedia_wkinews as 
the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as respondent scores for the independent variable 
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increase, the score for the dependent variable will increase. According to Table 3 (below), this 
hypothesis is not supported.  
PRMEDIA_WKINEWS 
During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on the Internet, not 
including sports? 
0. None 
1. One day 
2. Two days 
3. Three days 
4. Four days 
5. Five days 
6. Six days 
7. Seven days 
 
 
Table 3.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_wkinews 
  
  N Mean (SD) 
 
 
    0. None 1231 2.02 (0.70) 
    1. One day 461 2.05 (0.68)  
    2. Two days 440 2.13 (0.70)  
    3. Three days 504 2.13 (0.72)  
    4. Four days 336 2.07 (0.70)  
    5. Five days 670 2.08 (0.70)  
    6. Six days 354 2.09 (0.70)  
    7. Seven days 1604 2.08 (0.72)  
    Total 5600 2.07 (0.71)  
        
    F-Statistic  2.027  Figure 3.  Means Plots of  
respons_elections2 by prmedia_wkinews Significance   .048  
 
Though the results of this analysis are statistically significant, Figure 3 shows that the means 
plots do not fall in a line as expected, instead more resembling a normal curve. There is also little 
substantive difference in the average values of respons_elections2 here. This does not support 
my hypothesis or theory. 
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Also according to my theory, respondents who pay a great deal of attention to Internet 
news also feel more satisfied with the ideal that the government pays attention to what the people 
think. Therefore, I expect that as values for prmedia_atinews2 increase, the average values for 
respons_elections2 will increase as well. 
PRMEDIA_ATINEWS2 
How much attention do you pay to news about national politics on the Internet? 
1. None at all 
2. A little 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A lot 
5. A great deal 
Table 4.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_atinews2 
 
 
 
   N Mean (SD) 
    
 
1.00 None at all 401 1.96 (0.75) 
   
 
2.00 A little 1314 2.06 (0.70)  
   
 
3.00 A moderate 
amount 
1424 2.10 (0.69)  
   
 
4.00 A lot 735 2.10 (0.70)  
   
 
5.00 A great deal 495 2.17 (0.73)  
   
 
Total 4369 2.08 (0.71)  
        
    F-Statistic  5.629  
    Significance   .000  Figure 4.  Means Plots of  
respons_elections2 by prmedia_atinews2 
    
Table 4 shows that the results of this analysis are statistically significant. It also shows that as the 
values for prmedia_atinews2 increase, the values for respons_elections2 also increase from 1.96 
to 2.17. This supports my theory and hypothesis. However, it should be noted that there is little 
substantive difference, with the overall increase only being about 4% between the two values. 
My theory also suggests that the more days in a week a person watches national news on 
TV, the more likely that person will be to think elections make government pay attention to what 
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people think. This is because people who watch TV news more often feel more satisfied with the 
ideal that the government pays attention to what the people think. This hypothesis was tested 
using a one-way ANOVA with repsons_elections2 as the dependent variable and 
prmedia_wktvnws as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as values for the 
independent variable increase, values for the dependent variable will increase. According to 
Table 5 (below), this hypothesis is supported. 
PRMEDIA_WKTVNWS 
During a typical week, how many days do you watch national news on TV, not including sports? 
0. None 
1. One day 
2. Two days 
3. Three days 
4. Four days 
5. Five days 
6. Six days 
7. Seven days 
 Table 5.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_wktvnws 
 
 
 
   N Mean (SD) 
     0. None 891 1.96 (0.71) 
    1. One day 483 1.96 (0.69)  
    2. Two days 544 2.06 (0.70)  
    3. Three days 533 2.07 (0.71)  
    4. Four days 425 2.05 (0.70)  
    5. Five days 851 2.10 (0.70)  
    6. Six days 446 2.07 (0.70)  
    7. Seven days 1713 2.18 (0.71)  
    Total 5886 2.08 (0.71)  
        Figure 5.  Means Plots of  
respons_elections2 by prmedia_wktvnws F-Statistic  10.596  
Significance   .000  
     
Table 5 shows another statistically significant relationship, and we can see that as the values of 
the independent variable increase the values of the dependent variable also increase. This 
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supports my hypothesis and theory. However, this is another analysis yielding little substantive 
difference between the average values of the dependent variable. The increase shown here is 
from 1.96 to 2.18, a difference of about 4%. 
I also expect that the more attention a person pays to TV news about national politics, the 
more they will feel that elections make government pay attention to what the people think. This 
is because people who pay more attention to national political news on TV feel more satisfied 
with the normative ideal that elections make the government pay attention to what the people 
think. Using a one-way ANOVA with respons_elections2 as the dependent variable and 
prmedia_attvnews2 as the independent variable I tested this hypothesis. I hypothesize that as 
values for the independent variable increase, values for the dependent variable will also increase. 
According to Table 6 (below), this hypothesis is supported.  
PRMEDIA_ATTVNEWS2 
How much attention do you pay to news about national politics on TV? 
1. None at all 
2. A little 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A lot 
5. A great deal 
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Table 6.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_attvnews2 
 
 
  N Mean (SD)  
     1.00 None at all 138 1.85 (0.78) 
    2.00 A little 1164 1.96 (0.68)  
    3.00 A moderate 
amount 
1730 2.07 (0.69)  
    4.00 A lot 1110 2.17 (0.70)  
    5.00 A great deal 849 2.29 (0.71)  
    Total 4991 2.10 (0.71)  
    
        F-Statistic 
 
35.478      Significance   .000      
    
Figure 6.  Means Plots of  
respons_elections2 by prmedia_attvnews2 
    
The results of this analysis are statistically significant, and we can see that as the value of 
prmedia_attvnews2 increases, the average value for respons_elections2 also increases. Table 6 
shows that the average value of the dependent variable increases from 1.85 to 2.29. This supports 
my hypothesis and my theory. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more days per week a person reads news in 
newspapers, the more they feel that elections make government pay attention to what people 
think. I expect this because people who read news in the newspaper more often will feel that the 
government pays attention to what people think. To test this I ran a one-way ANOVA with 
respons_elections2 as the dependent variable and prmedia_wkpaprnws as the independent 
variable. My hypothesis is that as respondent scores for the independent variable increase, the 
score for the dependent variable will increase. According to Table 7 (below), this hypothesis is 
not supported. 
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PRMEDIA_WKPAPRNWS 
During a typical week, how many days do you read news in a printed newspaper, not including 
sports? 
0. None 
1. One day 
2. Two days 
3. Three days 
4. Four days 
5. Five days 
6. Six days 
7. Seven days 
 
Table 7.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_wkpaprnws 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 2422 2.04 (0.71) 
    1 1. One day 909 2.08 (0.71)  
    2 2. Two days 546 2.09 (0.70)  
    3 3. Three days 399 2.16 (0.68)  
    4 4. Four days 208 2.15 (0.70)  
    5 5. Five days 302 2.09 (0.74)  
    6 6. Six days 188 2.13 (0.67)  
    7 7. Seven days 910 2.08 (0.70)  
    Total 5884 2.07 (0.71)  
    
        F-Statistic 
 
2.201  Figure 7.  Means Plots of respons_elections2 by prmedia_wkpaprnws Significance   .031  
Table 7 shows that these results are statistically significant, but the expected shape is not present. 
As Figure 7 shows, the means plots resemble a normal curve more than a line as expected. This 
does not support my hypothesis or theory. 
According to my theory, I expect that as the values of prmedia_atpprnews2 increase, the 
average values for respons_elections2 will also increase. This is expected because people who 
pay more attention to newspaper news will feel that the government pays attention to what 
people think. To test this I ran a one-way ANOVA with respons_elections2 as the dependent 
variable and prmedia_atpprnews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as 
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respondent scores on the independent variable increase, values on the dependent variable will 
increase. According to Table 8 (below), this hypothesis is supported. 
PRMEDIA_ATPPRNEWS2 
How much attention do you pay to news about national politics in printed newspapers? 
1. None at all 
2. A little 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A lot 
5. A great deal 
 
Table 8.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_atpprnews2 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 239 1.94 (0374) 
    2.00 A little 1096 2.01 (0.69)  
    3.00 A moderate 
amount 
1150 2.13 (0.69)  
    4.00 A lot 610 2.17 (0.71)  
    5.00 A great deal 367 2.25 (0.70)  
    Total 3462 2.10 (0.70)  
    
        F-Statistic 
 
13.477  
 
Significance   .000  
    
    
    
    
Figure 8.  Means Plots of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_atpprnews2 
    Table 8 shows that as values for prmedia_atpprnews2 increase the values for respons_elections2 
also increase (from 1.94 to 2.25). The results of this analysis are also highly significant and the 
means plots fall in a line as expected; therefore, my hypothesis and theory are supported. 
According to my theory, people who put in the effort to listen to radio news often feel 
more satisfied with the ideal that government pays attention to what people think. To test this 
hypothesis I used a one-way ANOVA with repsons_elections2 as the dependent variable and 
prmedia_wkrdnws as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as values for the 
  
49  
independent variable increase, values for the dependent variable will increase. According to 
Table 9 (below), this hypothesis is supported. 
PRMEDIA_WKRDNWS 
During a typical week, how many days do you listen to news on the radio, not including sports? 
0. None 
1. One day 
2. Two days 
3. Three days 
4. Four days 
5. Five days 
6. Six days 
7. Seven days 
 
Table 9.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_wkrdnws 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 2273 2.03 (0.71) 
    1 1. One day 474 2.09 (0.66)  
    2 2. Two days 534 2.08 (0.72)  
    3 3. Three days 441 2.10 (0.68)  
    4 4. Four days 309 2.05 (0.70)  
    5 5. Five days 955 2.07 (0.71)  
    6 6. Six days 178 2.20 (0.72)  
    7 7. Seven days 719 2.17 (0.73)  
    Total 5883 2.07 (0.71)  
    
        F-Statistic 
 
3.820  Figure 9.  Means Plots of respons_elections2 by prmedia_wkrdnws Significance   .000  
 
As can be seen in Table 9, the results of this analysis are significant and we can see that—though 
it is not a neat line—the values of the independent variable increase as the values of the 
dependent variable also increase. This supports my hypothesis and theory. However, it should be 
noted that this relationship has little substantive difference. The overall increase is from 2.03 to 
2.17, a difference of less than 3%. 
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My theory also suggests that the more attention a person pays to radio news about 
national politics, the more they will think that elections make the government pay attention to the 
people. This is because respondents who pay more attention to radio news about national politics 
feel more strongly that the government pays attention to what the people think. In order to test 
this hypothesis I ran a one-way ANOVA with respons_elections2 as the dependent variable and 
prmedia_atrdnews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as values for the 
independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will increase. Table 10 
(below) shows this hypothesis to be supported. 
PRMEDIA_ATRDNEWS2 
How much attention do you pay to news about national politics on the radio? 
1. None at all 
2. A little 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A lot 
5. A great deal 
 
Table 10.  One-way ANOVA of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_atrdnews2 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 238 2.00 (0.70) 
     2.00 A little 1080 2.04 (0.68) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
1155 2.09 (0.70) 
     4.00 A lot 681 2.17 (0.73) 
     5.00 A great deal 453 2.25 (0.72) 
     Total 3607 2.10 (0.71) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  10.047 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 10.  Means Plots of 
respons_elections2 by prmedia_atrdnews2    
  
Table 10 shows highly significant results and Figure 10 shows that the means plots fall in a line. 
This supports my hypothesis and theory. However, this is another analysis with little substantive   
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difference. The low mean value for respons_elections2 is 2.00 and the high value is 2.25, an 
overall difference of 5%. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more people pay attention to what is going on 
in government and politics, the more they feel that people like themselves have a say in what the 
government does. In order to test this, I ran a one-way ANOVA with effic_saystd as the 
dependent variable and interest_attention2 as the independent variable. The wording of the 
survey question and possible respondent answers for effic_saystd can be found below. The 
independent variables for the rest of the ANOVAs are the same as those used in the first ten 
ANOVAs. The reader can refer back to previous analyses for the survey wording of the 
independent variables in the remaining analyses. My hypothesis is that as respondent scores on 
the independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will also increase. 
According to Table 11 (below), the hypothesis is supported by this analysis.  
EFFIC_SAYSTD  
People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
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Table 11.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by interest_attention2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 Never 80 2.50 (1.18) 
     2.00 Some of the time 763 2.59 (1.20) 
     3.00 About half the 
time 
630 2.70 (1.22) 
     4.00 Most of the time 1034 2.92 (1.28) 
     5.00 Always 500 3.12 (1.37) 
     Total 3007 2.81 (1.27) 
        
     F-Statistic  17.922 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 11.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
interest_attention2 
    
The results of this analysis are statistically significant. Table 11 and Figure 11 show that as the 
value of interest_attention2 increases, the average value for effic_saystd also increases. The 
average value increases from 2.50 to 3.12. This supports my hypothesis and my theory. 
My theory also suggests that the more interest people have for political campaigns, the 
more strongly they feel that people like themselves have a say in what the government does. This 
is because people who are interested in political campaigns feel satisfied with the normative ideal 
that they have a say in what the government does. To test this, I ran a one-way ANOVA with 
effic_saystd as the dependent variable and interest_following2 as the independent variable. The 
wording of the survey question and responses for the variables in this analysis can be found 
above. My hypothesis is that as respondent scores on the independent variable increase, values 
on the dependent variable will increase. According to Table 12 (below), this hypothesis is 
supported. 
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Table 12.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by interest_following2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 Not much 
interested 
445 2.45 (1.18) 
     2.00 Somewhat 
interested 
1248 2.70 (1.21) 
     3.00 Very much 
interested 
1313 3.05 (1.32) 
     Total 3006 2.81 (1.27) 
        
     F-Statistic  46.990 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 12.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
interest_following2 
    
Table 12 shows that the results of this analysis are statistically significant. Also, as values for 
interest_following2 increase the values for effic_saystd also increase with the low value being 
2.45 and the high value being 3.05. As can be seen in Figure 12, the means plots for this analysis 
fall in a nearly straight line as expected. This supports my hypothesis and theory 
I also expect that as the values for prmedia_wkinews increase, the average values for 
effic_saystd will increase. This is because respondents who often view news on the Internet will 
feel that people like themselves have a say in what the government does. I used a one-way 
ANOVA to test this. My dependent variable here is effic_saystd while the independent variable 
is prmedia_wkinews, and my hypothesis is that as the value of the independent variable 
increases, the value of the dependent variable will also increase. As Table 13 (below) shows, this 
hypothesis is supported. 
 
 
 
  
54  
 
Table 13.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_saystd by prmedia_wkinews 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 634 2.67 (1.26) 
     1 1. One day 238 2.79 (1.22) 
     2 2. Two days 221 2.81 (1.26) 
     3 3. Three days 257 2.82 (1.25) 
     4 4. Four days 174 2.83 (1.25) 
     5 5. Five days 364 2.83 (1.27) 
     6 6. Six days 182 2.87 (1.26) 
     7 7. Seven days 787 2.94 (1.28) 
     Total 2857 2.82 (1.27) 
        
     F-Statistic  2.314 
 
Figure 13.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_wkinews Significance   .024 
  
This is another statistically significant analysis, and we can see from Table 13 that, as expected, 
the values of the dependent variable increase as the values of the independent variable increase. 
These results support my hypothesis and theory. However, similar to the analysis of 
respons_elections to by prmedia_wkinews, the range of average values for the dependent 
variable here (2.67 to 2.94) is not substantively different. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more attention a person pays to news about 
national politics on the Internet, the more they will feel that people like themselves have a say in 
what the government does. In order to test this a one-way ANOVA was used with effic_saystd as 
the dependent variable and prmedia_atinews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that 
as values for the independent variable increase, values for the dependent variable will also 
increase. According to Table 14 (below), this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 14.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by prmedia_atinews2 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 199 2.49 (1.24) 
     2.00 A little 697 2.75 (1.23) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
686 2.88 (1.23) 
     4.00 A lot 380 3.06 (1.25) 
     5.00 A great deal 261 3.14 (1.37) 
     Total 2223 2.87 (1.26) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  11.400 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 14.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_atinews2 
    
Table 14 shows that these results are statistically significant. It also shows that as the values for 
prmedia_atinews2 increase, the values for effic_saystd also increase from 2.49 to 3.14. This 
supports my theory and hypothesis.  
Also according to my theory, I expect that the more days in a week a person watches 
national news on TV, the more likely that person will be to think they have a say in what the 
government does. This is because people who often view national news on TV feel more 
satisfied with the normative ideal that the people have a say in what the government does. This 
hypothesis was tested using a one-way ANOVA with effic_saystd as the dependent variable and 
prmedia_wktvnws as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as values for the 
independent variable increase, values for the dependent variable will also increase. According to 
Table 15 (below), this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 15.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by prmedia_wktvnws 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 460 2.71 (1.27) 
     1 1. One day 232 2.62 (1.19) 
     2 2. Two days 272 2.69 (1.22) 
     3 3. Three days 273 2.74 (1.19) 
     4 4. Four days 217 2.92 (1.25) 
     5 5. Five days 453 2.80 (1.24) 
     6 6. Six days 227 2.96 (1.26) 
     7 7. Seven days 873 2.92 (1.35) 
     Total 3007 2.81 (1.27) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  3.237 
 
Figure 15.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_wktvnws Significance   .002 
  
Table 15 shows another analysis with statistically significant results, and we can see that as the 
values of the independent variable increase the values of the dependent variable also increase. 
This supports my hypothesis and theory. The average value for the dependent variable increase 
from 2.71 to 2.92, a change of about 4%, meaning there is little substantive difference between 
the low and high average values for the dependent variable. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more attention a person pays to TV news about 
national politics, the more they will feel that people like themselves have a say in what the 
government does. This is because respondents who pay a great deal of attention to TV news will 
feel more satisfied with the ideal that the people have a say in what the government does. Using 
a one-way ANOVA with effic_saystd as the dependent variable and prmedia_attvnews2 as the 
independent variable I tested this hypothesis. I hypothesize that as values for the independent 
variable increase, values for the dependent variable will also increase. According to Table 16 
(below), this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 16.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by prmedia_attvnews2 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 69 2.64 (1.24) 
     2.00 A little 604 2.55 (1.19) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
876 2.79 (1.23) 
     4.00 A lot 578 3.01 (1.31) 
     5.00 A great deal 416 3.10 (1.35) 
     Total 2543 2.83 (1.27) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  15.665 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 16.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_attvnews2 
    
Here we see another analysis with highly significant results. We also see that, except for a slight 
dip between “None at all” and “A little”, as the value of prmedia_attvnews2 increases, the 
average value for effic_saystd increases. As can be seen in Table 16, the average value increases 
from 2.64 to 3.10. This supports my hypothesis and my theory. 
I also expect that the more days per week a person reads news in newspapers, the more 
they feel that people like themselves have a say in what the government does. To test this, I ran a 
one-way ANOVA with effic_saystd as the dependent variable and prmedia_wkpaprnws as the 
independent variable. My hypothesis is that as respondent scores for the independent variable 
increase, the score for the dependent variable will increase. According to Table 17 (below), this 
hypothesis is not supported. 
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Table 17.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by prmedia_wkpaprnws 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 1249 2.75 (1.30) 
     1 1. One day 473 2.80 (1.23) 
     2 2. Two days 270 2.84 (1.25) 
     3 3. Three days 200 2.80 (1.26) 
     4 4. Four days 103 3.04 (1.27) 
     5 5. Five days 163 2.84 (1.31) 
     6 6. Six days 99 2.84 (1.33) 
     7 7. Seven days 449 2.92 (1.24) 
     Total 3006 2.81 (1.27) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  1.436 
 
Figure 17.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_wkpaprnws Significance   .186 
  
Looking at Table 17, we see that the results of this analysis are not statistically significant. The 
expected shape in the means plots is also not present. Therefore, these results do not support my 
hypothesis or theory. 
According to my theory, I expect that as values for prmedia_atpprnews2 increase, the 
values for effic_saystd will increase. This is because respondents who pay more attention to 
news about national politics in newspapers feel more strongly that people like themselves have a 
say in what the government does. Using a one-way ANOVA with effic_saystd as the dependent 
variable and prmedia_atpprnews2 as the independent variable I tested this hypothesis. I 
hypothesize that as values for the independent variable increase, values for the dependent 
variable will also increase. According to Table 18 (below), this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 18.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by prmedia_atpprnews2 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 124 2.42 (1.24) 
     2.00 A little 576 2.73 (1.21) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
578 2.87 (1.20) 
     4.00 A lot 305 3.09 (1.27) 
     5.00 A great deal 174 3.13 (1.42) 
     Total 1757 2.86 (1.26) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  10.112 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 18.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_atpprnews2 
    
The results of this analysis are statistically significant. As the value of prmedia_atpprnews2 
increases the average value for effic_saystd increases, giving us means plots that fall in a line as 
expected. Table 18 shows that the average value increases from 2.42 to 3.13. This supports my 
hypothesis and my theory. 
I also expect that the more days in a week a person listens to news on the radio, the more 
likely they are to think that people like them have a say in what the government does. This is 
because people who often listen to news on the radio feel strongly that they have a say in what 
the government does. Using effic_saystd as my dependent variable and prmedia_wkrdnws as my 
independent variable, I used a one-way ANOVA to test this. My hypothesis is that as the value 
of the independent variable increases, the value of the dependent variable will also increase. As 
Table 19 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 19.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by prmedia_wkrdnws 
 
 
 
    
  N Mean (SD) 
 
    
0 0. None 1144 2.71 (1.25) 
 
    
1 1. One day 234 2.84 (1.21) 
 
    
2 2. Two days 268 2.74 (1.21) 
 
    
3 3. Three days 228 2.90 (1.26) 
 
    
4 4. Four days 158 2.79 (1.23) 
 
    
5 5. Five days 510 2.90 (1.28) 
 
    
6 6. Six days 103 3.18 (1.26) 
 
    
7 7. Seven days 361 2.89 (1.41) 
 
    
Total 3006 2.81 (1.27) 
 
    
 
  
 
    
F-Statistic  3.089 
 
Figure 19.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_wkrdnws Significance   .003 
  
Looking at Table 19, we see that the results of this analysis are statistically significant, and, as 
expected, the values of the dependent variable increase with the values of the independent 
variable. This supports my hypothesis and theory. However, the substantive difference of the 
range here is in question as the average value for people who listen to the radio six days a week 
is 3.18, but that value jumps down to 2.89 for people who listen to the radio seven days a week. 
My theory also suggests that the more attention a person puts toward news about national 
politics on the radio, the more they will feel that people like themselves have a say in what the 
government does. This is because respondents who pay more attention to radio news are more 
likely to feel satisfied with the normative ideal that people like themselves have a say in what the 
government does. Using a one-way ANOVA with effic_saystd as the dependent variable and 
prmedia_atrdnews2 as the independent variable I tested this hypothesis. I hypothesize that as 
values for the independent variable increase, values for the dependent variable will also increase. 
According to Table 20 (below), this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 20.  One-way ANOVA of effic_saystd 
by prmedia_atrdnews2 
 
 
 
    
  N Mean (SD) 
 
    
1.00 None at all 126 2.52 (1.20) 
 
    
2.00 A little 556 2.78 (1.28) 
 
    
3.00 A moderate 
amount 
593 2.84 (1.24) 
     4.00 A lot 361 2.98 (1.28) 
     5.00 A great deal 224 3.21 (1.38) 
     Total 1860 2.87 (1.28) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  7.854 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 20.  Means Plots of effic_saystd by 
prmedia_atrdnews2 
    
The results of this analysis are statistically significant. As the value of prmedia_atrdnews2 
increases, the average value for effic_saystd increases, supporting my expectation. Also, Table 
20 shows that the average value of the dependent variable increases from 2.52 to 3.21. This 
supports my hypothesis and my theory. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more often a person pays attention to news 
about government and politics, the more that person feels that public officials care what people 
like them think. I expect this because people who pay more attention to government and politics 
feel more satisfied with the normative ideal that public officials care about what the average 
person thinks. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the dependent 
variable and interest_attention2 as the independent variable. The wording of the survey question 
and answers for effic_carerev2 can be found below. My hypothesis is that as the values for the 
independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will also increase. As Table 
21 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported.  
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EFFIC_CAREREV2 
How much do public officials care what people like you think? 
1. Not at all 
2. A little 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A lot 
5. A great deal 
 
Table 21.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by interest_attention2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 Never 68 1.85 (0.98) 
     2.00 Some of the time 750 2.20 (0.95) 
     3.00 About half the 
time 
611 2.30 (0.91) 
     4.00 Most of the time 918 2.43 (0.92) 
     5.00 Always 521 2.59 (1.05) 
     Total 2868 2.36 (0.96) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  19.203 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 21.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by interest_attention2 
    
Looking at Table 21 and Figure 21 we see that as the values for the independent variable 
increase, the average values for the dependent variable increase from 1.85 to 2.59. Given that 
this is the expected relationship and the results are statistically significant, these findings support 
my hypothesis and theory. 
I also expect that the more interested a person is in political campaigns, the more that 
person feels the government cares what people like them think. I expect this because people who 
are interested in political campaigns are more likely to think that the government cares what they 
think. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the dependent variable and 
interest_following2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as the values for the 
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independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will also increase. As Table 
22 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported.  
 
Table 22.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by interest_following2 
 
 
 
    
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 Not much 
interested 
439 1.93 (0.88) 
     2.00 Somewhat 
interested 
1197 2.29 (0.90) 
     3.00 Very much 
interested 
1231 2.57 (0.99) 
     Total 2867 2.37 (0.96) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  81.600 
     Significance   .000 
 
    
Figure 22.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by interest_following2 
    
Figure 22 shows that the average values for effic_carerev2 increase as the values for 
interest_following2 increase, as expected. Table 22 shows that these results are statistically 
significant. These findings support my hypothesis and theory. 
My theory also suggests that respondents who often view news on the Internet will feel 
more satisfied with the ideal that public officials care about what people like themselves think. 
Using a one-way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the dependent variable and prmedia_wkinews 
as the independent variable I tested this hypothesis. I hypothesize that as values for the 
independent variable increase, values for the dependent variable will also increase. According to 
Table 23 (below), this hypothesis is not supported. 
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Table 23.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_wkinews 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 597 2.27 (1.01) 
     1 1. One day 219 2.34 (0.90) 
     2 2. Two days 219 2.42 (1.01) 
     3 3. Three days 249 2.36 (0.90) 
     4 4. Four days 162 2.32 (0.91) 
     5 5. Five days 305 2.39 (0.94) 
     6 6. Six days 171 2.36 (0.82) 
     7 7. Seven days 812 2.41 (0.96) 
     Total 2734 2.36 (0.95) 
     
        F-Statistic 
 
1.248 
 
Figure 23.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_wkinews Significance   .272 
  
As Table 23 shows, the results of this ANOVA are not statistically significant. Because there is 
not statistical significance, this hypothesis is not supported. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more attention a person pays to news about 
national politics on the Internet, the more that person feels that public officials care what people 
like them think. I expect this because respondents who pay a great deal of attention to Internet 
news will also feel more satisfied with the ideal that public officials care about what the people 
think. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the dependent variable and 
prmedia_atinews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as the values for the 
independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will also increase. As Table 
24 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 24.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_atinews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 202 2.13 (0.94) 
     2.00 A little 616 2.24 (0.90) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
737 2.42 (0.86) 
     4.00 A lot 353 2.58 (0.97) 
     5.00 A great deal 229 2.59 (1.11) 
     Total 2137 2.38 (0.94) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  14.529 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 24.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_atinews2 
    
As can be seen in Table 24 and Figure 24, the average values for the dependent variable increase 
(from 2.13 to 2.59) as the values for the independent variable increase. These results support my 
hypothesis and theory given that the results are statistically significant. 
I also expect that as a person’s weekly national TV news consumption goes up, there 
belief that public officials care what they think will also go up. This is because people who often 
view TV news feel more strongly that public officials care about what people like themselves 
think. In order to test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the dependent 
variable and prmedia_wktvnws as the independent variable. The hypothesis is that as the values 
for the independent variable increase the values for the dependent variable will also increase. 
The results (shown in Table 25 below) support this hypothesis. 
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Table 25.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_wktvnws 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 428 2.16 (0.96) 
     1 1. One day 247 2.23 (0.86) 
     2 2. Two days 269 2.29 (0.96) 
     3 3. Three days 262 2.44 (0.98) 
     4 4. Four days 207 2.36 (0.99) 
     5 5. Five days 398 2.31 (0.91) 
     6 6. Six days 217 2.40 (0.88) 
     7 7. Seven days 839 2.50 (1.00) 
     Total 2867 2.36 (0.96) 
     
        F-Statistic 
 
6.439 
 
Figure 25.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_wktvnws Significance   .000 
  
Looking at Table 25, we see that the results of this ANOVA are statistically significant. Though 
there is a spike at three days per week, the relationship has the expected shape; as the 
independent variable increase the dependent variable also increase from 2.16 to 2.50. This results 
support my hypothesis and theory. 
My theory also suggests that the more attention one gives to TV news about national 
politics, the more they will feel that public officials care about what people like them think. This 
is because respondents who pay a great deal of attention to news about national politics on TV 
are more likely to think that public officials care about what people like them think. Using a one-
way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the dependent variable and prmedia_attvnews2 as the 
independent variable I tested this hypothesis. My hypothesis is that as values for the independent 
variable increase, values for the dependent variable will also increase. According to Table 26 
(below), this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 26.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_attvnews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 67 1.78 (0.95) 
     2.00 A little 561 2.13 (0.85) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
853 2.31 (0.90) 
     4.00 A lot 527 2.59 (0.95) 
     5.00 A great deal 431 2.73 (1.04) 
     Total 2439 2.39 (0.96) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  40.656 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 26.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_attvnews2 
    
Table 26 shows that these results are statistically significant, and that as scores for the 
independent variable increase average scores for the dependent variable increase from 1.78 to 
2.73. These findings support both my hypothesis and my theory. 
According to my theory, I also expect that the more days in a week a person reads news 
in newspapers, the more likely they are to think that public officials care about what people like 
them think. Using effic_carerev2 as my dependent variable and prmedia_wkpaprnws as my 
independent variable, I used a one-way ANOVA to test this. My hypothesis is that as the value 
of the independent variable increases, the value of the dependent variable will also increase. As 
Table 27 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 27.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_wkpaprnws 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 1168 2.28 (0.97) 
     1 1. One day 429 2.39 (0.99) 
     2 2. Two days 277 2.32 (0.92) 
     3 3. Three days 200 2.52 (0.96) 
     4 4. Four days 103 2.38 (0.95) 
     5 5. Five days 139 2.45 (1.02) 
     6 6. Six days 89 2.42 (0.93) 
     7 7. Seven days 461 2.43 (0.93) 
     Total 2866 2.36 (0.96) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  2.731 
 
Figure 27.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_wkpaprnws Significance   .008 
  
Looking at Table 27, we see that these results are statistically significant, and, as expected, the 
values of the dependent variable increase with the values of the independent variable. This 
supports my theory and hypothesis. However, the range between the low and high average values 
of the dependent variable is too low for there to be any substantive difference. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more attention a person pays to news about 
national politics in newspapers, the more that person feels that public officials care what the 
average person thinks. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the 
dependent variable and prmedia_atpprnews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that 
as the values for the independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will 
also increase. As Table 28 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 28.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_atpprnews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 114 2.08 (0.99) 
     2.00 A little 518 2.22 (0.91) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
569 2.46 (0.91) 
     4.00 A lot 304 2.57 (0.95) 
     5.00 A great deal 193 2.76 (1.05) 
     Total 1698 2.41 (0.96) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  17.947 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 28.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_atpprnews2 
    
Table 28 show that as the values for the independent variable increase, the average values for the 
dependent variable increase from 2.08 to 2.76. The means plots for this ANOVA also fall in a 
linear shape as expected. These findings support my hypothesis and theory. 
My theory also suggests that the more days in a week a person listens to news on the 
radio, the more likely they are to think that public officials care about what people like them 
think. This is because people who often listen to news on the radio feel strongly that public 
officials care about what people like them think. Using effic_carerev2 as my dependent variable 
and prmedia_wkrdnws as my independent variable, I used a one-way ANOVA to test this. My 
hypothesis is that as the value of the independent variable increases, the value of the dependent 
variable will also increase. Table 29 (below) shows that this hypothesis is not supported. 
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Table 29.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_wkrdnws 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 1124 2.28 (0.96) 
     1 1. One day 238 2.47 (0.86) 
     2 2. Two days 263 2.38 (0.99) 
     3 3. Three days 212 2.27 (0.93) 
     4 4. Four days 151 2.33 (0.96) 
     5 5. Five days 442 2.38 (0.90) 
     6 6. Six days 76 2.46 (1.10) 
     7 7. Seven days 359 2.50 (1.05) 
     Total 2865 2.36 (0.96) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  3.000 
 
Figure 29.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_wkrdnws Significance   .004 
  
Looking at Table 29, we see that the results of this ANOVA are statistically significant. 
However, the results do not show the linear shape that was expected unless one excludes the 
results for respondents listening to radio news zero, one and two days a week. There is also little 
substantive difference between the high and low average values of effic_carerev2. These results 
do not support my hypothesis and theory. 
According to my theory, people who pay more attention to radio news feel more strongly 
that public officials care what they think. Therefore, I expect that respondents who pay greater 
attention to radio news about national politics will also respond with greater satisfaction to the 
normative ideal that public officials care about what people like themselves think. To test this, I 
used a one-way ANOVA with effic_carerev2 as the dependent variable and prmedia_atrdnews2 
as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as the values for the independent variable 
increase, the values for the dependent variable will also increase. As Table 30 (below) shows, 
this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 30.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_carerev2 by prmedia_atrdnews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 112 2.12 (0.99) 
     2.00 A little 519 2.29 (0.88) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
562 2.38 (0.95) 
     4.00 A lot 319 2.53 (0.95) 
     5.00 A great deal 228 2.71 (1.06) 
     Total 1740 2.40 (0.96) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  12.024 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 30.  Means Plots of effic_carerev2 
by prmedia_atrdnews2 
    
The results of this analysis are statistically significant and, as can be seen in Figure 30, the 
expected linear shape is present in the means plots. Table 30 shows that as values for the 
independent variable increase, the average values for the dependent variable increase from 2.12 
to 2.71. These findings support my hypothesis and theory. 
According to my theory, I expect that the more often a person pays attention to news 
about government and politics, the more a person feels that people like them can affect what the 
government does. I expect this because people who pay more attention to what is going on in 
government and politics feel more satisfied with the normative ideal that people like themselves 
affect what the government does. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_sayrev2 as 
the dependent variable and interest_attention2 as the independent variable. The wording of the 
survey question and possible answers for effic_sayrev2 can be found below. My hypothesis is 
that as the values for the independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will 
also increase. As Table 31 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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EFFIC_SAYREV2  
How much can people like you affect what the government does? 
1. Not at all 
2. A little 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A lot 
5. A great deal 
 
Table 31.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by interest_attention2 
 
 
 
      N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 Never 69 2.06 (1.20) 
     2.00 Some of the time 755 2.39 (1.07) 
     3.00 About half the 
time 
612 2.49 (1.03) 
     4.00 Most of the time 921 2.75 (1.07) 
     5.00 Always 521 3.06 (1.21) 
     Total 2878 2.64 (1.12) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  39.144 
 Significance   .000 
 
Figure 31.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by interest_attention2 
    
Table 31 we see that the results of this analysis are statistically significant. It also shows that as 
values for the independent variable increase, the average values for the dependent variable 
increase from 2.06 to 3.06 in a linear fashion. These results are in line with my expectations and 
they support my hypothesis and theory. 
Also according to my theory, I expect that the more interested a person is in political 
campaigns, the more that person feels that people like them can affect what the government does. 
I expect this because people who are interested in political campaigns are more likely to think 
that they can affect what the government does. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with 
effic_sayrev2 as the dependent variable and interest_following2 as the independent variable. My 
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hypothesis is that as the values for the independent variable increase, the values for the 
dependent variable will also increase. As Table 32 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
 
Table 32.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by interest_following2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 Not much 
interested 
443 2.15 (1.04) 
     2.00 Somewhat 
interested 
1201 2.51 (1.05) 
     3.00 Very much 
interested 
1233 2.94 (1.13) 
     Total 2877 2.64 (1.12) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  100.227 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 32.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by interest_following2 
    
As Table 32 shows, the average values for the dependent variable increase as the values for the 
independent variable increase. Figure 32 shows the means plots for this ANOVA, revealing a 
neat line as expected. Given that these results are also statistically significant, these findings 
support my hypothesis and theory. 
My theory also suggests that the more often a person views Internet news, the more they 
will feel that people like themselves can affect what the government does. This is because people 
who often view news on the Internet feel more satisfied with the ideal that people like 
themselves can affect what the government does. Using a one-way ANOVA with effic_sayrev2 
as the dependent variable and prmedia_wkinews as the independent variable I tested this 
hypothesis. My hypothesis is that as values for the independent variable increase, values for the 
dependent variable will also increase. As Table 33 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 33.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_wkinews 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 599 2.47 (1.14) 
     1 1. One day 222 2.54 (1.03) 
     2 2. Two days 219 2.78 (1.17) 
     3 3. Three days 249 2.66 (1.15) 
     4 4. Four days 162 2.64 (1.05) 
     5 5. Five days 305 2.74 (1.08) 
     6 6. Six days 171 2.67 (0.94) 
     7 7. Seven days 815 2.69 (1.14) 
     Total 2742 2.63 (1.11) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  3.440 
 
Figure 33.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_wkinews Significance   .001 
  
Table 33 shows another set of statistically significant results. Though the means plots do not fall 
in a neat line, the overall trend is that as the values for the independent variable increase, the 
average values for the dependent variable also increase. This supports my theory and hypothesis. 
However, there is little substantive difference between the values of 2.47 and 2.69, an overall 
increase of about 4%. 
I also expect that the more attention a person pays to news about national politics on the 
Internet, the more they person will feel as though people like themselves can affect what the 
government does. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_sayrev2 as the dependent 
variable and prmedia_atinews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as the values 
for the independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will also increase. As 
Table 34 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 34.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_atinews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 204 2.31 (1.09) 
     2.00 A little 618 2.47 (1.09) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
736 2.73 (1.02) 
     4.00 A lot 354 2.86 (1.05) 
     5.00 A great deal 231 3.14 (1.25) 
     Total 2143 2.68 (1.10) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  24.975 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 34.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_atinews2 
    
As can be seen in Table 34, the results of this ANOVA are highly significant. We also see that as 
the values for prmedia_atinews2 increase, the average values for effic_sayrev2 also increase 
from 2.31 to 3.14. These findings support my hypothesis and theory. 
According to my theory, I expect that as a person’s weekly national TV news 
consumption goes up, there belief that people like themselves can affect what the government 
does will also go up. This is because people who often view TV news feel more strongly that 
people like themselves can affect what the government does. In order to test this, I used a one-
way ANOVA with effic_sayrev2 as the dependent variable and prmedia_wktvnws as the 
independent variable. The hypothesis is that as the values for the independent variable increase 
the values for the dependent variable will also increase. The results (shown in Table 35 below) 
support this hypothesis. 
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Table 35.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_wktvnws 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 429 2.40 (1.07) 
     1 1. One day 249 2.47 (1.05) 
     2 2. Two days 271 2.57 (1.16) 
     3 3. Three days 262 2.73 (1.05) 
     4 4. Four days 207 2.58 (1.11) 
     5 5. Five days 398 2.67 (1.13) 
     6 6. Six days 218 2.65 (1.10) 
     7 7. Seven days 843 2.81 (1.15) 
     Total 2877 2.64 (1.12) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  6.852 
 
Figure 35.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_wktvnws Significance   .000 
  
My expectations for this analysis are met. Looking at Table 35, we see that the results are 
statistically significant, and as the values for the independent variable increase the average values 
for the dependent variable increase from 2.40 to 2.81. This supports my hypothesis and theory. 
My theory also suggests that the more attention one gives to TV news about national 
politics, the more they will feel that people like themselves can affect what the government does. 
This is because people who pay more attention to national political news on TV are more likely 
to feel that they can affect what the government does. Using a one-way ANOVA with 
effic_sayrev2 as the dependent variable and prmedia_attvnews2 as the independent variable I 
tested this hypothesis. My hypothesis is that as values for the independent variable increase, 
values for the dependent variable will also increase. According to Table 36 (below), this 
hypothesis is supported. 
 
 
  
77  
Table 36.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_attvnews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 69 2.16 (1.17) 
     2.00 A little 562 2.36 (1.05) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
856 2.60 (1.08) 
     4.00 A lot 529 2.83 (1.05) 
     5.00 A great deal 432 3.17 (1.17) 
     Total 2448 2.68 (1.12) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  41.414 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 36.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_attvnews2 
    
The results of this ANOVA strongly support my theory and hypothesis. The means plots in 
Figure 36 show that as the scores for the independent variable increase, average scores for the 
dependent variable also increase from 2.16 to 3.17. The results are also statistically significant, 
as shown in Table 36.  
According to my theory, I also expect that the more days in a week a person reads news 
in newspapers, the more likely they are to think that they can affect what the government does. 
This is because people who often read news in newspapers believe strongly in the normative 
ideal that people like themselves can affect what the government does. Using effic_sayrev2 as 
my dependent variable and prmedia_wkpaprnws as my independent variable, I used a one-way 
ANOVA to test this. My hypothesis is that as the value of the independent variable increases, the 
value of the dependent variable will also increase. As Table 37 (below) shows, this hypothesis is 
not supported. 
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Table 37.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_wkpaprnws 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 1171 2.57 (1.15) 
     1 1. One day 433 2.59 (1.07) 
     2 2. Two days 278 2.65 (1.10) 
     3 3. Three days 200 2.89 (1.07) 
     4 4. Four days 105 2.84 (1.15) 
     5 5. Five days 139 2.84 (1.16) 
     6 6. Six days 89 2.63 (1.15) 
     7 7. Seven days 461 2.63 (1.08) 
     Total 2876 2.64 (1.12) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  3.282 
 
Figure 37.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_wkpaprnws Significance   .002 
  
We again have highly significant results from this analysis. However, Figure 37 shows that the 
means plots resemble more closely a normal curve than a line. The average values for 
effic_sayrev2 increase initially with the scores for prmedia_wkpaprnws, but then dip down again 
as the values for the independent variable continue to increase. These findings do not support my 
theory or hypothesis.  
According to my theory, I expect that the more attention a person pays to news about 
national politics in newspapers, the more that person will feel that people like themselves can 
affect what the government does. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_sayrev2 as 
the dependent variable and prmedia_atpprnews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is 
that as the values for the independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will 
also increase. As Table 38 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 38.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_atpprnews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 116 2.38 (1.20) 
     2.00 A little 518 2.43 (1.04) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
573 2.69 (1.04) 
     4.00 A lot 305 2.93 (1.07) 
     5.00 A great deal 193 3.12 (1.19) 
     Total 1705 2.69 (1.10) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  21.366 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 38.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_atpprnews2 
    
Looking at Table 38, we see that the results of this analysis are highly significant. As expected, 
the values of the dependent variable increase with the values of the independent variable. The 
average values of effic_sayrev2 start at 2.38 for respondents answering “None at all” and 
steadily increase to 3.12 for respondents answering “A great deal”. This supports my theory and 
hypothesis.  
My theory suggests that the more days in a week a person listens to news on the radio, 
the more likely they are to think that people like themselves can affect what the government 
does. This is because people who often listen to news on the radio often feel more satisfied with 
the ideal that people like themselves can affect what the government does. Using effic_sayrev2 
as my dependent variable and prmedia_wkrdnws as my independent variable, I used a one-way 
ANOVA to test this. My hypothesis is that as the value of the independent variable increases, the 
value of the dependent variable will also increase. Table 39 (below) shows that this hypothesis is 
supported. 
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Table 39.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_wkrdnws 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     0 0. None 1128 2.49 (1.09) 
     1 1. One day 238 2.68 (1.07) 
     2 2. Two days 265 2.80 (1.13) 
     3 3. Three days 213 2.61 (1.10) 
     4 4. Four days 152 2.76 (1.13) 
     5 5. Five days 444 2.68 (1.12) 
     6 6. Six days 76 2.74 (1.14) 
     7 7. Seven days 359 2.87 (1.17) 
     Total 2875 2.64 (1.12) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  6.331 
 
Figure 39.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_wkrdnws Significance   .000 
  
Though there is some up and down movement in the means plots as seen in Figure 39, the 
overall trend in the average values for the dependent variable is upward as expected. Given that 
these results are statistically significant, as seen in Table 39, these results support my theory and 
hypothesis.  
According to my theory, I expect that the more attention a person pays to news about 
national politics on the radio, the more that person thinks that people like them can affect what 
the government does. To test this, I used a one-way ANOVA with effic_sayrev2 as the 
dependent variable and prmedia_atrdnews2 as the independent variable. My hypothesis is that as 
the values for the independent variable increase, the values for the dependent variable will also 
increase. As Table 40 (below) shows, this hypothesis is supported. 
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Table 40.  One-way ANOVA of 
effic_sayrev2 by prmedia_atrdnews2 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean (SD) 
     1.00 None at all 113 2.50 (1.19) 
     2.00 A little 523 2.30 (1.05) 
     3.00 A moderate 
amount 
562 2.69 (1.09) 
     4.00 A lot 320 2.91 (1.06) 
     5.00 A great deal 228 3.21 (1.27) 
     Total 1746 2.74 (1.13) 
     
 
  
     F-Statistic  18.453 
     Significance   .000 
 
Figure 40.  Means Plots of effic_sayrev2 
by prmedia_atrdnews2 
    
As has been the case for all of my ANOVAs that use prmedia_atrdnews2 for the independent 
variable, the results here are statistically significant and the means plots fall in a line as expected. 
The average values of effic_sayrev2 in this analysis increase from 2.50 to 3.21. These findings 
support my hypothesis and theory. 
 The results discussed above show strong support for my theory. Though not ubiquitous 
throughout all forty ANOVAs—and though we cannot say there is causation here—the results 
give credence to the idea that people who put more effort into gaining political knowledge feel 
more content with their government. The results here show that there is a correlation between 
these two variables. Even excluding ANOVAs that yielded little substantive difference between 
the high and low average values of the dependent variable, twenty-five of the forty ANOVAs 
discussed above support my theory. Those twenty-five analyses yielded results that were 
statistically significant and met my expectation that as respondent scores for the independent 
(competence) variables increased, scores for the dependent (satisfaction) variables would also 
increase.  
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Analyses yielding low substantive difference are not included in those twenty-five 
because the increases in average values for the satisfaction variables in those analyses were very 
small. Results for those ANOVAs yielded significant results and often had means plots showing 
the expected shape; however, the average values of the dependent variable increased so little that 
there was little substantive difference between respondents with low competence and 
respondents with high competence. If we include the analyses that failed to make the cut only 
because they lacked substantive difference, the number of ANOVAs that support my theory 
jumps to thirty-four. Put another way, only six out of the forty ANOVAs showed no support 
whatsoever for my theory. 
There are limitations, however, to how much we can learn from these results. Though 
many of the analyses yielded results with substantive difference in the range of values for the 
dependent variable, many had limited substantive difference. Another limitation is in how well 
the ANES questions I used actually measure the concepts I was using them to look at. Though 
the questions I used were the best questions available in the ANES for the task, questions that are 
more carefully crafted to measure the desired concepts will do a better job of measuring both the 
competence of the respondent and their feelings about normative ideals. For example, primers 
that briefly state the ideals being looked at may allow respondents to better assess whether or not 
they feel that public officials truly care about what people like themselves think. 
Future research should look more closely at the idea of competence being a matter of 
effort by diving further into the various things that American citizens do on a day-to-day basis 
that add to their political knowledge. Though my study used ten different measurements for 
competence, there are hundreds if not thousands of possible factors that go into citizen 
competence which were not taken into account here. The number of factors affecting citizen 
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competence is reminiscent of the quote from Walter Lippmann that began this thesis. Lippmann 
described the environment that humans operate in as having, “So much subtlety, so much 
variety, so many permutations and combinations.” This is true of a more specific concept like 
citizen competence as well. News outlets on the Internet, TV, radio and newspapers are just a 
few of the possible sources of political information for Americans.  
The expansion of Internet and smartphone use has greatly increased the number of 
information sources for citizens. Each major news outlet now has one or more smartphone 
applications available to consumers that need to be taken into account when assessing the effort a 
citizen exerts gathering political information. Twitter and Facebook are also common sources of 
political news for Americans. Taking every single source of information into account may not be 
possible but future research should include interactions with peers, political rallies, debates, 
speeches, the newer technologies mentioned above and much more if a comprehensive 
understanding of citizen competence is to be acquired. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
  
As I mentioned in the Introduction to this paper, the lens through which I view political 
science was built, in part, by the work of E. E. Schattschneider. In his book The Semisovereign 
People, Schattschneider says, “Democracy is like nearly everything else we do; it is a form of 
collaboration of ignorant people and experts.” (Schattschneider [1960] 1975: 134) But ignorance 
is not failure; it merely means that one does not have a deep understanding of a subject or idea. 
That is what the experts are for. In a system of collaboration between experts and non-experts, 
what matters for the non-experts is the effort they put into the collaboration.  
I argue that effort in information gathering is one of the contributing factors to citizen 
competence. This means that many previous studies looking at citizen competence need to be 
reexamined. Much of the literature I read during my research for this piece contained negative 
conclusions about the intelligence or competence of the American people. From such 
conclusions the authors would make profound claims about the implications that an unintelligent 
or incompetent electorate has on a democracy. Studies that condemn the American public, and 
American democracy in general, because citizens do not know enough about their political 
system need to be rethought with this definition of competence in mind. Nearly every book I 
read in the process of writing this thesis had a section—or at least a few pages—dedicated to 
arguing that democracy is best with an informed citizenry. I do not doubt the importance of 
being informed, but in order for a person to be informed they have to attempt to gather 
information. This is not a chicken-and-egg scenario. Information gathering comes first.  
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 Another implication of my effort-based definition of citizen competence deals with 
theories of large number, specifically Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). This theory states that as 
the number of people taking part in a decision grows, the likelihood of the correct decision being 
made increases. (Landemore 2013: 70) According to CJT, the judgement accuracy of a group is 
directly tied to the number of people in it. The theory assumes that each person has a slightly 
greater than fifty percent chance of being right; therefore, as you increase the number of people, 
the judgement accuracy of the group grows to the point where massive groups like the American 
electorate are almost certainly going to be correct in their decision. My definition of competence 
adds another dimension to such theories. If competence is tied to effort, and if competence 
affects the judgement accuracy of an individual, then not only must a group be large in order for 
strong decisions to be made; the group members must also put effort into their decisions. This is 
not the only reason to track, study and promote an effort-based definition of competence, 
however. 
 As was shown in Chapter 3, there is a correlation between citizen competence and the 
satisfaction citizens feel with normative ideals. This has some important implications for future 
studies looking at the various aspects of citizen satisfaction and how competence affects 
satisfaction or contentment. One might, for example, look at the effect competence has on other 
widely held normative ideals. Does competence increase a person’s satisfaction with the idea that 
elections matter? Looking at specific groups is another option for future work. Studies may look 
at the effect competence has on members of one political party or another, strong partisans 
versus weak partisans or people of varying ages. 
 Finally, this research has important implications regarding the goal of government. 
Various philosophers throughout history have prescribed different goals that governments are to 
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promote. There likely isn’t one true goal, but a variety of goals that citizens think their 
government should do. Some common claims regarding the goal of government are that the 
government is supposed to promote the public good, which often means promoting property 
ownership and commerce in the nation. Other goals that people commonly give to governments 
are that a government should maintain law and order or liberty. Still others feel that the purpose 
of government is to promote the utility or happiness of its citizens, and this is where my research 
comes in.  
 If the main goal of government—or at the very least a priority of government—is to 
promote the happiness of its citizens, then the results of the analyses above need to be paid 
careful attention. Even if the satisfaction I have discussed in this thesis is only one small part of 
overall citizen contentment, it is still important to note because the goal of government is to 
promote the happiness of its people. According to the results above, one way government can 
promote the happiness of its citizens is by having competent citizens. This means that creating a 
political system that people want to know about and participate in and one that is easy to learn 
about and easy to participate in will develop happy citizens. Rather than having a political and 
social system that sometimes considers gathering political information, discussing politics or 
general political activity taboo, our system should promote and foster such behavior. 
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